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We analyze and contrast the US and EU antitrust standards on mixed bundling 
and tying. We apply our analysis to the US and EU cases against Microsoft on the issue 
of tying new products (Internet Explorer in the US, and Windows Media Player in the 
EU) with Windows as well as to cases brought in Europe and in the United States on 
bundling discounts. We conclude that there are differences between the EC and US 
antitrust law on the choice of the relevant analogy for bundled rebates (predatory price 
standard or foreclosure standard) and the implementation of the distinct product and 
coercion test for tying practices. The second important difference between the two 
jurisdictions concerns the interpretation of the requirement of anticompetitive 
foreclosure. It seems to us that in Europe, consumer detriment is found easily and it is not 
always a requirement for the application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of 
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The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States 





Allegations of anti-competitive tying and bundling were significant parts of 
the antitrust cases against Microsoft in the United States and the European 
Communities. Interestingly, the two cases, which had many similarities in their tying 
and bundling allegations, had opposite final resolutions. In the United States, the 
Department of Justice decided not to pursue the bundling aspect of the case (between 
Windows and Internet Explorer) after the DC Court of Appeals reversed the finding 
of a per se violation of the District Court and remanded the issue with instructions 
that it could be pursued only under a rule of reason standard.
1 In contrast, in the EU, 
the Commission found that Microsoft was liable for bundling Windows with 
Windows Media Player (WMP) and required Microsoft to produce a Windows 
version without WMP, in addition to the bundled version that Microsoft offered on 
the market.
2 Microsoft was not allowed to offer any technological, commercial or 
contractual term or inducement to make the bundled version the more attractive, and a 
monitoring trustee was required to ensure that the unbundled version of Windows 
works as well as the bundled version.
3 The Grand Chamber of the Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities (hereinafter CFI) confirmed the Commission’s 
decision, although it annulled the part of the Commission’s decision that imposed a 
monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the decision by a monitoring trustee, 
at the cost of Microsoft.
4 This sharp difference in the application of competition law 
arises because of different treatment of tying, bundling, single-product and multi-
product (loyalty) discounts, foreclosure and exclusion in the two jurisdictions. This 
article discusses and contrasts antitrust and competition policy enforcement on these 
issues in the US and the EU in light of recent advances in economic analysis. 
 
                                            
1 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (hereinafter DC Circuit); On the US 
Microsoft case, see, among others, Nicholas Economides, The Microsoft Antitrust Case, 1(1) JOURNAL 
OF INDUSTRY, COMPETITION AND TRADE 7 (2001), lead article. Pre-publication electronic copy 
available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Microsoft_Antitrust.final.pdf ; Nicholas Economides, 
The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder, 1(1) JOURNAL OF INDUSTRY, COMPETITION AND TRADE 71-79 
(2001). Pre-publication electronic copy available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Microsoft_Antitrust.Rejoinder.pdf ; Nicholas Economides, United 
States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy, Symposium: Cyber Rights, Protection, 
and Markets, UWLA Law Review, (April 2001), lead article. Pre-publication electronic copy available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/UWLA.pdf ; David S. Evans, Albert L. Nichols & Richard 
Schmalensee, US v. Microsoft: Did Consumers Win? (NBER Working Paper No. 11727, October 
2005), NBER: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11727; Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-framing 
Windows: The Durable Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 679; 
WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE – ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND 
CONSUMER WELFARE (2007); A. Douglas Melamed & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, US v. Microsoft: Lessons 
Learned and Issues Raised, in ANTITRUST STORIES 287 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane ed., 2007). 
2 EC Commission, Microsoft (hereinafter Microsoft) [2004], [2005] 4 CMLR 965. 
3 Id. para 1011-1012. 
4 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v. Commission [2007] 5 CMLR 846, para 1278. Microsoft did not appeal 
the decision of the CFI to the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ). 
  3We will first examine the different analogies in the antitrust standards applied 
to bundling in both jurisdictions and we will analyze how the different steps of the 
antitrust assessment of tying practices fit with the choice of a different analogy. We 
will then focus on the important differences that exist between EC competition law 
and US antitrust law with regard to the finding of anticompetitive foreclosure by a 
dominant firm. This part will show that although both systems of antitrust law aim to 
protect competition for the benefit of consumers, there are important differences in 
the way consumer harm is assessed in each jurisdiction. The final part will consider 
the remedies imposed and their effectiveness in preserving consumer choice, which 
seems to be the underlying objective of competition law in Europe and in the United 
States. 
 
2. Different analogies in the antitrust standards applied to bundling 
 
The area of bundled discounts has certainly been one of the most controversial 
issues in recent competition law enforcement against exclusionary anticompetitive 
practices of dominant firms.
5 Much discussion revolved on the choice of the right 
analogy for this category of practices in relation to other practices which may produce 
similar exclusionary effect, such as exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, and tying. 
Although one may consider that this quest for the “right” analogy asks the wrong 
question, as the real issue is the effect of these practices on consumer welfare,
6 which 
relates to the circumstances of each case, it is clear that the choice of a different 
analogy may explain much of the divergence between the antitrust standards on these 
practices in the US and in the EU. 
 
                                            
5 See, Michael Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 838 (1990); Barry 
Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 159 (2004); Bruce 
Kobayashi, Does Economics provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling By Firms? 
A Survey of the Economics Literature, 1 JOCLEC 707 (2005); Bruce Kobayashi, The Economics of 
Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States, 1 COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 115 (2005); 
Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688 (2005); Daniel Rubinfeld, 
3M Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 243 (2005); David Spector, 
Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 
1 COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 89 (2005); Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of 
Nonprice Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005); Kai-Uwe Kühn, Robert Stillman & Christina 
Caffara, Economic Theories of Bundling and their Policy Implications in Abuse Cases: An Assessment 
in Light of the Microsoft Case, 1 EUROPEAN COMP. J. 85 (2005); Christian Ahlborn & David Bailey, 
Discounts, Rebates and Selective Pricing by Dominant Firms: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST, 195 (Philip Marsden ed. 2006); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841; Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory 
Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 863; Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 
Article 82 Rebates: Four Common Fallacies, 2 EUR. COMP. J. 85 (2006); Martin Bechenkamp & Frank 
P. Maier-Rigaux, An Experimental Investigation of Article 82 Rebate Schemes, 2(2) COMP. L. REV. 1; 
John Simpson & Abraham A. Wickegren, Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory and Downstream 
Competition, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 370 (2007); Gregory K. Leonard, The Competitive Effects of 
Bundled Discounts, 3, Chap. 1, in ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST COMPLEX ISSUES IN A DYNAMIC 
ECONOMY (Laurence Wu ed., 2007); Timothy J. Brennan, Bundled Rebates as Exclusionary, not 
Predatory (June 18, 2007), SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=99290 ; Patrick 
Greenlee, David S. Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discount 
(Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 04-13, October 2004); Janusz A. Ordover & Greg 
Shaffer, Exclusionary Discounts (CCP Working Paper No. 07-13, June 2007), SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995426. 
6 ROBERT O’ DONOGHUE & JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 EC, 2006, at 
500. 
  4We start with a discussion of competition policy on bundled discounts in the 
EU and the US. This is an area where the two systems of law diverge. We then 
examine the relevant antitrust tests for tying and conclude that the different steps of 
the antitrust assessment in the EU look, at first sight, similar to those that apply to 
tying in the US. It is therefore important to examine what, according to the case law, 
distinguishes a tying from a bundled discount case as the characterization of the 
practice will have implications on the antitrust standard that will apply and could lead 
to a different outcome if the case was brought in the EU or in the US. 
 
2.1 The US antitrust standard for bundled discounts 
 
US law focuses on discounts available in a product bundle. Suppose that an 
array of products bought by the same buyer are offered a la carte. Additionally, 
buyers are offered a discount if a buyer fulfils a specific requirement contract, for 
example, if he buys at least 90% of his “needs” for several products from this seller. 
This is generally called in economics “mixed bundling.” A firm dominant in one 
market can use this strategy to leverage its monopoly or dominant position to other 
products where its market position is weaker. Additionally this strategy can be used 
for monopoly maintenance across markets. In the US, there are divergent opinions on 
its legality at different appeals circuits. 
 
On one hand, there are circuits which do not accept that discounts may amount 
to anticompetitive conduct if the effective price charged to one or more products in 
the bundle is not “predatory” or below some measure of cost.
7 The following test has 
been suggested: calculate the total dollar discount (across all the products of the 
bundle) and then apply it all to the competitive products. If the resulting hypothetical 
price for the competitive product of the bundle is above a measure of per unit cost, 
there is no antitrust violation. There are of course questions on whether the right cost 
measure should be marginal cost, average variable cost or average total cost, but the 
basic idea is that unless one can construct a predatory price analogy, there is no 
antitrust violation. Additionally, courts that have used this standard have not imposed 
a requirement of recoupment in the future. We call this the “modified predatory 
pricing rule” approach. 
 
On the other hand, there are circuits that consider that bundled discounts may 
in some circumstances amount to anti-competitive behavior even when the dominant 
firm would not be liable under the modified predatory pricing rule approach.
8 A 
central issue in this alternative approach is the possibility that bundled pricing 
strategies may foreclose or exclude equally efficient rivals even if the discount results 
in prices that are above costs. Interestingly, these courts make an analogy between 
bundled discounts and tying, as all these practices may lead to anticompetitive market 
foreclosure. We call this the “anticompetitive foreclosure approach” to bundling. 
 
                                            
7 Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp, 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-1062 (8
th Cir. 2000); Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd 
v British Airways, 257 F.3d 256 (2 Cir. 2001); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 
(9
th Cir. 2007). 
8 SmithKline Corp v. Eli Lilly & Co, 575 F.2d 1056 (3
rd Cir. 1978); LePage’s Inc v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 
(3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953, 124 S.Ct. 2932 (2004); United States v Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 
399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005). 
  52.1.1 The “modified predatory pricing rule approach” to bundling 
 
In Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, the Ninth Circuit held that an 
antitrust plaintiff can prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory, for 
the purposes of a claim of monopolization or an attempted monopolization under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act only if the plaintiff established that “after allocating the 
discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the competitive 
product or products, the defendant sold the competitive product or products below its 
average variable cost of producing them.”
9 The case arose from a challenge by 
McKenzie to the pricing strategies of PeaceHealth, a non-profit provider of hospital 
care services in Lane County, Oregon. PeaceHealth and McKenzie were the only 
hospital care providers in the County. McKenzie offered only primary and secondary 
hospital care and not tertiary hospital services, which involve more complex services, 
such as invasive cardiovascular and intensive neonatal care. PeaceHealth offered 
insurance companies, which are the effective purchasers of hospital services on behalf 
of consumers, discounts on “tertiary” hospital services, if they made PeaceHealth 
their sole preferred provider for all hospital services: primary, secondary and tertiary. 
It also offered to insurance companies less favorable terms concerning the 
reimbursement rate if McKenzie was added as a preferred provider of primary and 
secondary services. The jury found in favor of McKenzie on its claim of attempted 
monopolization and PeaceHealth appealed the judgment.  
 
The Ninth Circuit focused on the conduct element of the attempted 
monopolization claim. Remarking that bundled discounts are “a common feature” of 
the current economic system, as they are used by both large corporations and smaller 
firms,
10 the Court’s opinion emphasized that they “always provide some immediate 
consumer benefit in the form of lower prices” and that they can also result in savings 
for the seller, as “it usually costs a firm less to sell multiple products to one customer 
at the same time than it does to sell the products individually.”
11 The pervasive 
character of mixed bundling and the fact that “price cutting is a practice the antitrust 
laws aim to promote
12 “led the Court to emphasize the risks of false positives in 
applying §2 of the Sherman Act and to advocate a cautious approach which should 
not discourage legitimate price competition. It also affirmed, however, that, “it is 
possible, at least in theory”
13 that a firm uses a bundled discount to exclude an equally 
or more efficient rival and therefore reduce consumer welfare in the long run. This 
can be done without any sacrifice of short run profits if the multi-product firm will be 
able to exclude less diversified but more efficient rivals who will not be able to sell 
above their average variable costs the product on the market in which they compete 
with the multi-product firm.  
 
                                            
9 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, above n 7, at 920. 
10 Id. at fn 5. The Court also referred to the “endemic nature of bundled discounts in many spheres of 
normal economic activity” as a reason to decline to endorse the Third Circuit’s anticompetitive 
foreclosure standard for bundled discounts in LePage’s Inc v. 3M, above n 8. Id. 
“The frequency with which we see bundled discounts in varied contexts does not insulate such 
discounts from antitrust review, but it heightens the need to ensure that the rule adopted does 
not expose inventive and legitimate forms of price competition to an overbroad liability 
standard.” 
11 Id. at 906. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
  6The Ninth Circuit refused to apply an anticompetitive foreclosure test that 
would essentially look to the structure of the market resulting from the bundled 
discount but considered instead that “the exclusionary conduct element of a claim 
arising under §2 Sherman Act cannot be satisfied by reference to bundled discounts 
unless the discounts result in prices that are below an appropriate measure of the 
defendant’s costs.”
14 As a cost-based rule the Court adopted the “discount attribution 
standard” or “discount allocation standard”
15: 
 
“Under this standard, the full amount of the discounts given by the defendant 
on the bundle are allocated to the competitive product or products. If the 
resulting price of the competitive product or products is below the defendant's 
incremental cost to produce them, the trier of fact may find that the bundled 
discount is exclusionary for the purpose of § 2. This standard makes the 
defendant's bundled discounts legal unless the discounts have the potential to 




The Ninth Circuit used as “an appropriate measure of the defendant’s (incremental) 
costs,” average variable costs, the same as it uses for predatory pricing.
17
 
The Ninth Circuit adopted a predatory pricing standard for bundled discounts 
for essentially two reasons: First, the alternative foreclosure standard will lead to false 
positives and it lacks clarity as it is does not provide firms with objective criteria to 
which they can compare their commercial strategies and determine ex ante if these 
will lead to liability under §2 Sherman Act.
18 Second, the anticompetitive foreclosure 
standard may have the effect of protecting a less efficient competitor as the possibility 
of exclusion of a rival that has higher average variable costs will lead to the 
application of §2 of the Sherman Act, if the effect of this exclusion will be to extend 
or maintain the market power of the firm employing the bundled discount practice. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on alleged differences 
between bundled discounts and tying practices: 
 
“…one difference between traditional tying by contract and tying via package 
discounts is that the traditional tying contract typically forces the buyer to 
accept both products, as well as the cost savings (quoting Areeda & 
Hovenkamp). Conversely, the package discount gives the buyer the choice of 
accepting the cost savings by purchasing the package, or foregoing the savings 
by purchasing the products separately (quoting again Areeda & Hovenkamp). 
The package discount thus does not constrain the buyer’s choice as much as 
the traditional tie. For that reason, the late Professor Areeda and Professor 
Hovenkamp suggest that “variation of the requirement that prices be below 
                                            
14 Id. at 914. 
15 Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Non Price Predation, above n 5, at 28. 
16 Id. at 916. 
17 Id. at 914 & 920. 
18 Id. at 913: 
“we think the course safer for consumers and our competitive economy to hold that bundled 
discounts may not be considered exclusionary conduct within the meaning of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act unless the discounts resemble the behavior that the Supreme Court…identified 
as predatory.” 
  7cost is essential for the plaintiff to establish one particular element of unlawful 
discounting – namely, that there was actually tying – that is, that the purchaser 




Areeda and Hovenkamp consider that bundled discounts are a specific form of 
tying but they also advocate a stricter standard to establish coercion under bundled 
discounts, in particular a requirement that the attributed prices are below some 
measure of cost, than the standard used under the traditional tying test. This is not 
similar to the claim that bundled discounts should be analyzed under the predatory 
pricing rule. However, the Ninth Circuit did not hesitate to establish an analogy 
between bundled discounts and predatory pricing and to refer to Supreme Court’s 
precedents on pricing abuses,
20 notwithstanding the fact that no specific argument 
other than that previously mentioned was made to support this analogy.  
 
From the case law of the Supreme Court on pricing abuses, the Ninth Circuit 
derived the proposition that “antitrust laws do not punish economic behavior that 
benefits consumers and will not cause long-run injury to the competitive process.”
21 
The benefits to consumers are immediate, “because the discounts allow the buyer to 
get more for less.”
22 It does not seem clear, however, how such a requirement would 
be incompatible with the alternative anticompetitive foreclosure test. The existence of 
exclusionary conduct is but one element of an attempted monopolization claim under 
§2 of the Sherman Act. For the practice to be considered as violating §2 it is 
necessary to prove also that there was a specific intent to monopolize and that there is 
a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power, the later requiring some 
examination of market power in the relevant market.
23 The chief purpose of these two 
additional elements of an attempted monopolization claim is to help courts to 
characterize ambiguous conduct that may be interpreted as being either pro-
competitive or anti-competitive. 
 
 A possible explanation of the Ninth Circuit’s position is that, in light of what 
some other courts have concluded, “before the conduct requirements for an unlawful 
attempt are met, the conduct must be sufficiently hostile to competition so as to be 
branded predatory.”
24 If one accepts this limitation, one may argue that the Court’s 
approach is restricted to attempted monopolization claims and does not concern 
monopolization claims under §2 Sherman Act. This is particularly important in 
establishing a comparison with the antitrust standards for bundling in EU, as EC 
competition law does not recognize a separate attempted monopolization offence. 
 
The Ninth Circuit relied also on the fact that the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (AMC), suggested a predatory pricing standard for bundled discounts. 
This standard requires that the plaintiff brings evidence that the defendant (after 
                                            
19 Id. at 911. 
20 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) 
“above-cost predatory pricing schemes, (are) beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to 
control”; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1078 (2007). 
21 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, above n 7, at 913. 
22 Id. at 906. 
23 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). 
24 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, 3d ed., (2005), at 338. 
  8attribution of the bundled discount) priced below incremental costs for the 
competitive product as well as that the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term 
losses and that the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an 
adverse effect on competition.
25 However, when it came to the definition of the 
different steps of the analysis for bundled discounts, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt 
the additional elements of the test advocated by the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, other than the appropriate measure of costs for the defendant. First, it 
refused to integrate the recoupment test of predatory pricing in the test applied to 
bundled discounts asserting that the bundled discounter may not lose any profits by 
bundling:.
26 Second, it found redundant the third limb of the test proposed by the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission, evidence of a likely adverse anticompetitive 
effect, as this is “no different than the general requirement of antitrust injury that a 
plaintiff must prove in any private antitrust action.”
27
 
As a matter of economics, adoption of the modified predatory pricing rule can 
result in a finding of no liability even when there are anti-competitive actions. First, 
even if one believes that bundling will be anti-competitive only when allocating the 
discount from all products to the competitive product(s) results in an effective price 
below some measure of unit cost, average variable cost is not the appropriate measure 
of cost. Firms need to cover their fixed costs as well to stay in business. Thus, the 
appropriate measure of cost should be average total cost, which includes a per unit 
(average) allocation of fixed cost. For example, to say an action is not anticompetitive 
when a firm prices above average variable cost but below average total cost makes no 
sense because a firm will not be able to survive in business in the long run under this 
pricing. Such pricing involves a short run profit sacrifice, is not part of normal firm 
behavior, and is highly suspect as to its anti-competitive motive. An antitrust standard 
should not consider as lawful a dominant firm’s behavior that imposes pricing on 
equally efficient competitors that does not allow them to survive in the long run. 
 
Second, an entrant may have higher unit costs because foreclosure as a result 
of bundling reduced its scale of operations. Thus, specifying a test that relies on the 
unit costs of the dominant firm (given the higher scale of its operations) can easily 
result in an incorrect finding of no liability and false negatives. 
 
Third, attention should be paid to the effects of the bundling strategies on 
consumers’ surplus. Use of bundling strategies can lead to the exclusion of one or 
more competitors. This can decrease consumers’ surplus, even when the excluded 
entrant is less efficient than the incumbent. Entry constrains pricing. Even entry by 
less efficient entrants can lead to lower prices. Thus, excluding entrants on the 
grounds of productive inefficiency (or creating tests that would exclude less efficient 
entrants out of hand) can reduce consumers’ surplus and increase allocative 
inefficiency (divergence of prices from costs).
28
                                            
25 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 95-97 (2007). 
26 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, above n 7, fn 21: “we do not believe that the recoupment 
requirement from single product cases translates to multi-product discounting cases. Single-product 
predatory pricing, unlike bundling, necessarily involves a loss for the defendant…By contrast, as 
discussed above, exclusionary bundling does not necessarily involve any loss of profits for the bundled 
discounter.” 
27 Id. 
28 This can be true in a variety of situations. For example, the “Efficient Components Pricing Rule” 
(ECPR) that determines prices for components in systems was proposed as way to keep inefficient 
  9 
Fourth, even starting from monopoly in one product and competition or 
oligopoly in a second product (or in more products), the introduction of mixed 
bundling strategies, where products are offered undiscounted a la carte as well as at a 
discounted price, a customer committing to buy at least x% of his needs in all the 
bundled products from the same firm, can lead to a reduction of consumers’ surplus.
29 
The monopolist can set an a la carte price above the monopoly price and charge 
approximately the monopoly price for the monopolized good under the 
bundle/requirements contract. The introduction of the bundle can make consumers 
worse off even when they have the choice of whether or not to accept the terms of the 
bundle. Even when, after the introduction of the bundle, each consumer is better off 
buying the bundle rather than buying at the a la carte prices available in the presence 
of the bundle, the aggregate effect of these decisions to buy the bundle allow the 
monopolist to set pricing so that it extracts more surplus than in unbundled monopoly 




Fifth, bundling can also be used to create threats of higher a la carte prices, 
even if all consumers buy under the bundle and therefore the threat buying at higher 
of a la carte prices is not enforced at equilibrium.
31
 
                                                                                                                             
entrants out of the market – see William J. Baumol, Some Subtle pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 
10(1-2) INT’L J. OF TRANSPORT ECON. 341 (1983) and Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access 
Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC REGULATION (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979). However, it has been shown 
that allowing even (moderately) inefficient entrants to enter the market increases consumers’ surplus 
because it decreases prices and reduces the allocative inefficiency of monopoly. See Nicholas 
Economides and Lawrence J. White, Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the ‘Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule’?, XL(3) ANTITRUST BULL. 557 (1995),. Pre-publication electronic copy 
available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_Access_and_interconnection_pricing.pdf. 
Nicholas Economides and Lawrence J. White, The Inefficiency of the ECPR yet Again: A Reply to Larson, 
XLIII(2) ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1998). Pre-publication electronic copy available at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/The_Inefficiency_of_the_ECPR.pdf. Nicholas Economides, The 
tragic inefficiency of M-ECPR, in DOWN TO THE WIRE: STUDIES IN THE DIFFUSION AND REGULATION OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Allan L. Shampine, ed. 2003). Pre-publication electronic copy 
available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/Economides_M-ECPR.pdf . 
29 See, for example, Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman & David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis 
of Bundled Loyalty Discounts, (Economic Analysis Group, U.S. Department of Justice, October 2004). 
This paper shows how a monopolist can extend his monopoly in the first market to the second market 
through offering a bundling scheme with a requirement that all or almost all purchases are made from 
the monopolist, and simultaneously increasing the price of the monopolized product when it is offered 
on a stand-alone basis. Greenlee et al. show in Theorem 2 (page 11) that the application of this 
bundling scheme reduces consumers’ welfare. Greenlee et al. show that consumers can be made worse 
off even when they have the choice of whether or not to take the bundle. Moreover, Greenlee et al. 
devise a test to ascertain if there are consumer losses: 
“If the firm maximizes profits and the standalone price of A exceeds the initial price of A, 
then we can infer that the bundled rebate reduces consumer welfare.” 
(at page 23). See also See Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as a Way to Leverage Monopoly, (Yale School of 
Management Working Paper 36, October 8, 2004), at 14-15. 
30 Since the prices under the bundle are better than the a la carte ones, it is individually rational for a 
consumer to buy under the bundle. However, collectively these actions of consumers strengthen the 
monopolist and allow him to increase both the a la carte and bundle prices.  
31 For example, see Barry Nalebuff, Tried and True Exclusion, 1(1) COMPETITION POLICY INT’L 41 
(2005).  
  10Sixth, the “discount” in the price of the bundle can be illusory as the a la carte 
price can be increased simultaneously with the offer of the bundle by more than the 
discount, so that, in the end the consumer who buys the bundle pays more than before 
the bundle was offered.
32 This strategy results in consumers buying the competitive 
good from the monopolist (of the first good) under the bundle resulting in (i) lower 
consumers’ surplus; and (ii) foreclosure of competitors in the “competitive” good(s).  
 
Seventh, the bundling strategy will tend to foreclose competitors in the second 
market, so that in the long run they are eliminated from the second market, and to the 
extent that re-entry is not easy, the monopolist will have a free reign to set an even 
higher price in the second market in the future. Thus, foreclosure of competitors can 
further reduce consumers’ surplus in the medium and long run.  
 
Eighth, bundling may be used as an entry-deterring device by making it 
economically unprofitable for an entrant to enter one market without simultaneously 
entering the second market.
33
 
2.1.2 “The anticompetitive foreclosure approach” to bundling 
 
Given these economic arguments, it is encouraging that some circuits have 
ruled that bundled discounts may in some circumstances amount to anti-competitive 
behavior even when the dominant firm would not be liable under the modified 
predatory pricing rule approach. Interestingly, these courts make an analogy between 
bundled discounts and tying, as all these practices lead to anticompetitive market 
foreclosure (the anticompetitive foreclosure criterion). 
 
In LePage’s Inc, the Third Circuit made explicit the analogy between bundled 
rebates and tying and adopted an abbreviated rule of reason approach. In that case, 
3M, a dominant supplier of transparent tape, bundled rebates relating to the purchase 
of its private label tape, which was a product in which it faced important competition 
from LePage’s, with a requirement that customers purchase other products from 3M’s 
different product lines that LePage’s did not offer. LePage’s argued that 3M’s 
behavior constituted monopolization under §2 Sherman Act, as by bundling its 
rebates, 3M had created a de facto exclusivity because the bundled rebates induced 
many of LePage’s major customers to eliminate or reduce their purchases of tape 
from LePage. 3M argued that its conduct was legal as it never priced its transparent 
tape below its cost. The Court did not examine whether 3M’s price of transparent tape 
was below a certain measure of its cost. It applied instead an anticompetitive 
foreclosure test:  
 
“the principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates… is that when offered 
by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a potential 
                                            
32 Rubinfeld calls such a discount a ‘“sham” discount.’ See Daniel Rubinfeld, 3M Bundled Rebates: An 
Economic Perspective, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 252 (2005). 
33 For example, see Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119(1) QUARTERLY J OF ECON. 159 
(2004), Daniel Rubinfeld, above n 32, at 256 (2005) & Aaron S. Edlin and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 
Exclusion or Efficient Pricing: The “Big Deal” Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST 
LAW JOURNAL 119 (2004). 
  11competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group of products 
and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.”
34
 
The Third Circuit found that foreclosure of LePage, which was a significant 
competitor, could lead to higher prices and reduced output. 3M could have later 
recouped the profits it had forsaken with the discount scheme by selling higher priced 
Scotch tape. This was a possible strategy in view of evidence indicating that 
“significant entry barriers” prevented competitors from entering the tape market in the 
US.
35 According to the Court, 3M’s practice had “long-term” anticompetitive effects, 
without 3M offering any adequate business justification for its practices.
36 The 
Supreme Court refused the petition for a writ of certiorari.
37
 
The decision has been controversial, in particular because the anticompetitive 
foreclosure test applied by the Court could lead to the application of §2 Sherman Act 
even if the excluded competitor was not as efficient as the defendant. As Judge 
Greenberg remarked in his dissenting opinion, “LePage’s is not as efficient a tape 
producer as 3M.”
38 The introduction of the requirement that §2 Sherman Act should 
only apply if the plaintiff brings evidence that the defendant priced below its average 
variable costs aims therefore to take into account the possible false positives that 
could follow from the full application of the anticompetitive foreclosure rule. 
 
 The debate is partly about allocating the burden of proof that the defendant is 
at least as efficient producer as the plaintiff and that therefore the exclusion of the 
latter is the consequence of business acumen and superior efficiency. One could 
consider that the anticompetitive foreclosure rule assumes that this is the case: if the 
defendant were as efficient as the plaintiff in the market of the competitive product, 
there is no need to bundle the sale of this product with discounts in lines of products 
which are not within the plaintiff’s product range. The defendant could have simply 
offered, as a least restrictive to competition alternative, single product discounts for 
the competitive product that could match or even be lower than the price charged by 
his rival. 
 
 Certainly, there may be efficiency reasons that could explain the decision of a 
firm to bundle products together, cost savings in production and distribution and price 
discrimination being the most notable ones.
39 Tying is a common practice in 
competitive markets as firms often compete with bundles of products and consumers 
are offered discounts if they buy the products that are part of the bundle. Evidence 
from the pervasive use of bundling in competitive markets would thus require the 
competition authorities or courts to adopt prima facie a positive view of such 
practices, unless they are used by firms with a dominant position and may exclude 
                                            
34 LePage’s Inc v. 3M, above n 8 at 155. 
35 Id. at 163. 
36 Id. 
37 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004). The decision followed a brief from the solicitor general 
suggesting that “there is insufficient experience with bundled discounts to this point to make a firm 
judgment about the relative prevalence of exclusionary versus procompetitive bundled discounts” 
(Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 3M v. LePage’s Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-
1865), available at WL 1205191 at 12. 
38 LePage’s Inc v. 3M, above n 8 at 177. 
39 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive 
Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 41-43 (2005). 
  12competitors that cannot offer the same bundle of items. The analysis of the practice 
under a rule of reason that would balance pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects 
would thus be an adequate antitrust standard.
40 This is the position taken by the Third 
Circuit in LePage’s.  
 
Some authors have nevertheless advanced the view that the application of the 
rule of reason -anticompetitive foreclosure standard to bundled discounts could still 
lead to false positives, in view of the difficulty in documenting efficiencies.
41 They 
suggest the adoption of a cost-based standard that would operate as a safe harbor for 
bundled discounts.
42 It is only if a rival as efficient as the dominant firm would be 
excluded from the market that the necessary costs of an extensive rule of reason 
inquiry should be incurred. The underlying assumption is that firms should be free in 
defining their pricing strategies. According to the Ninth Circuit in Cascade Health, it 
should be for the plaintiff to prove, along with the existence of anticompetitive 
effects, that the “challenged bundling practices would have excluded an (hypothetical) 
equally efficient rival, without reasonable justification.”
43 The inquiry would be 
whether the incremental price for the tied product (that its price under the bundle 
reduced by the allocation of the total discount for the whole bundle to the tied 
product) is below the defendant’s average variable cost of producing the tied 
product.
44 This is based on the assumption that lower prices indicate superior 
efficiency, unless it is otherwise demonstrated. 
 
However, this approach does not take into account the fact that bundled 
discounts may be a way for a dominant firm to impair the efficiency of its rivals 
“because rivals that have a long run cost curve which is as low as the defendant (and 
therefore are equally efficient in the long run) would be unable to achieve a price as 
low as the defendant’s average total costs, precisely because the foreclosure has 
relegated them to the high cost portion of their cost curve.”
45 Furthermore, they 
impose on the plaintiff an important hurdle, as cost data of rivals may be hard to get.  
 
One could also question the position that antitrust concerns should be limited 
to practices that exclude equally efficient firms. Excluding less efficient rivals may 
also produce a negative consumer welfare effect if that removes a competitive 
constraint on the market power of the defendant and thus allows the defendant to raise 
prices and reduce consumer surplus while the effects on total surplus are ambiguous. 
Indeed, the protection of the final consumer from wealth transfers may be an 
important objective of antitrust law, imposing a strict pass on requirement for any 
efficiency gains that the defendant advances as a justification for the adoption of a 
specific practice: a situation which is even more explicit in EC Competition Law.
46
                                            
40 In this case, the legal burden of proof will rest on the plaintiff, while the defendant will bear the 
evidentiary burden of substantiating the pro-competitive efficiency justifications for the bundled 
discount, after the plaintiff has brought evidence of an anticompetitive foreclosure effect. 
41 David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, above n 39, at 83.  
42 Hebert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841, 854.  
43 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, above n 7, at 917. 
44 Id., at 919 & 920. 
45 EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 1
st ed, (2007), 
at 576. 
46 See, Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/8, 
para 85-86 (the same principles could also apply to cases brought under Article 82 ). See, Commission, 
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2.2. The EU antitrust standard for bundled discounts 
 
We distinguish the case law of the European Courts (European Court of 
Justice and Court of First Instance), which seems to apply to bundled discounts the 
foreclosure approach courts usually employ for single product rebates, and the 
European Commission’s staff Discussion Paper, which analyzes bundled discounts 
under the separate heading of bundling. 
 
2.2.1. The approach of the European Courts: the foreclosure standard 
 
 The case law of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) and the CFI 
does not draw a difference between single product rebates and bundled discounts. The 
case law distinguishes between volume (quantity discounts), which are legal per se, 
and loyalty rebates, which are illegal in most circumstances. The European judiciary 
adopts a foreclosure test that does not require evidence that the discount on the 
competitive product was below an appropriate measure of the defendant’s cost. 
 
A dominant firm can give quantity discounts without infringing Article 82 if 
these are offered on equal terms to all customers of the firm. Discounts should also 
reflect efficiency gains (economies of scale in production, cost savings etc). Loyalty 
rebates rewarding exclusivity or strongly encouraging the customer to stay with the 




A system whereby the rebate is conditional on purchasing mainly or 
exclusively from the dominant undertaking is abusive in principle.
48 Dominant firms 
may not enter into exclusive purchasing agreements and may not operate rebate 
schemes, which have the same effect as an exclusive purchasing agreement. In 
Hoffmann La Roche v. Commission, the discounts were conditional on the customer’s 
obtaining all or most of its requirements on sometimes different vitamins – which 
were part of different relevant markets - from the undertaking in a dominant position. 
The Court found that these conditional rebates foreclosed the access of rival producers 
in the market




Article 82 case law has recently focused on target (individualized) retroactive 
discounts that produce an exclusionary and loyalty effect.
51 These are generally found 
to infringe Article 82 if they are capable of producing an exclusionary effect by 
                                                                                                                             
DG Competition Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses 
(hereinafter Discussion Paper), December 2005, para 88-89. 
47 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461; Case T-65/89, BPB Industries and 
British Gypsum Ltd v. Commission [1993] ECR II-389. 
48 Case 85/76 above n 47, para 89. 
49 Id. para 90. 
50 Id., para 110-111. 
51 Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461 
(hereinafter Michelin I); Case T-203/01, Manufacture Française des Pneumatiques Michelin v. 
Commission [2004] ECR II-4071(hereinafter Michelin II); Case T-219/99, British Airways v. 
Commission [2003] ECR II-5917; Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Commission [2007] available at 
http://www.curia.eu  
  14making market entry very difficult or impossible for competitors and there is no 
objective economic justification for the rebate system.
52 The fact that the excluded 
rivals may be less efficient firms than the defendant is not taken into account in the 
application of Article 82 EC. 
 
In Michelin II, the CFI found that discounts based on standardized sales 
targets over a relatively long reference period were abusive under Article 82. The 
rebates applied to the entire turnover achieved with Michelin (thus including many 
different products). To be eligible, a dealer had to achieve a pre-determined turnover 
target. These rebates were given according to a grid, which had a large number of 
steps. When a dealer went up a step by hitting a particular target, he obtained not just 
an extra payment on the last incremental sales, but on all previous purchases in the 
reference period. The rebates were not paid until February in the year following that 
in which the tire purchases were made. It was therefore difficult for the dealers to 
determine the actual unit purchase price of the tires before making the last orders of 
the year. This uncertainty induced them to minimize their risks and purchase wholly 
or mainly from Michelin. The variations in the final steps of the scheme created a 
suction effect, as this affected the dealers’ profit margins for the entire year, thus 
creating additional pressure to buy Michelin tires. Michelin’s competitors did not 
have only to offer a price on a customer’s marginal requirements, which matched 
Michelin’s price for that quantity, but had to offer a price so low as to offset the loss, 
which the dealer would make on all its purchases from Michelin, if he bought from 
Michelin’s rival. The purpose of the discount systems was to tie the dealers to 
Michelin. Those practices tended to restrict competition because they sought to make 
it more difficult for the applicant’s competitors to enter the relevant market. The 
Court did not consider relevant the fact that the market shares and sales of Michelin 
fell during the period in question. The fall would have been greater if Michelin had 
not adopted the rebate scheme.
53
 
The Court emphasized the need for multi-product dominant undertakings to 
compete on the merits with their rivals and to grant discounts only if these are 
economically justified, for example because the specific dealers bring an important 
volume of business which provides economies of scale to the producer that passes 
them to the dealers in the form of discounts. A central element in the Court’s decision 
is that “not all competition on price can be regarded as legitimate,”
54 a conclusion 
which seems to depart from the generally positive assumption over this type of 
competition in US antitrust law. However, this approach is compatible with the 
Court’s position that greater economic power creates greater responsibility.
55  
 
The position of the Court contrasts with that adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Cascades v. PeaceHealth, where the Court deemed important in evaluating the 
existence of anticompetitive effects the fact that bundled discounts constitute a 
                                            
52 Case C-95/04 P above n 51, para 68-69. 
53 Michelin II above n 51, para 245. 
54 Id. para 97. 
55 Id.  
“an undertaking in a dominant position has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market… An undertaking in a 
dominant position cannot have recourse to means other than those within the scope of 
competition on the merits.” 
  15“pervasive practice,” used by both larger and smaller corporations.
56 On the contrary, 
this is not an element that the Courts take into account in Europe. In our view, this 
approach may be explained by the specific structure and purpose of Article 82 EC. 
Contrary to §2 Sherman Act, which essentially prohibits monopolization, and 
therefore considers that a practice which is also used by non-dominant firms cannot 
indicate the existence of monopoly power or an intent to expand monopoly power, 
Article 82 adopts a regulatory approach: it is “less concerned about the creation of 
dominant positions and more focused on regulating their behavior once dominance 
has been achieved.”
57 Advocating that a practice is pervasive in the economy will not 
be relevant for the application of Article 82, as dominant firms have a special 
responsibility to preserve competition in the marketplace.
58  
 
 The scope of the application of Article 82 seems therefore to be broader than 
that of §2 of the Sherman Act. First, Article 82 reaches significantly lower market 
shares than does §2 of the Sherman Act, so that a dominant position may be found 
under Article 82 with a market share as low as 40%.
59 Second, the fact that non-
dominant firms also use the same practice is irrelevant, as the purpose of Article 82 is 
to impose specific responsibilities to dominant undertakings. This is particularly clear 
in Michelin II, where the Court of First Instance considered that “discounts granted by 
an undertaking in a dominant position must be based on a countervailing advantage 
which may be economically justified.”
60 In comparison, non-dominant undertakings 
are able to grant discounts even if these are not based on the economic justifications 
envisioned by the Court, such as economies of scale, and even if the result of these 
discounts will be the acquisition of a dominant position. However, once the threshold 
of dominance has been reached, the undertaking will not be able to continue providing 
these rebates, unless they provide an economic justification for “the discount rates 
chosen for the various steps in the rebate system in question.”
61 In this case, they do 
not constitute loyalty discounts but quantity discounts and are in conformity with 
                                            
56 Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth above n 7, fn 5. 
57 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Legal Periphery of Dominant Firm Conduct 4 (University of Iowa Legal 
Studies Research Paper, Number 07-21, 2007), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1014426  
58 Case C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 
57; Case T-201/04 above n 4, para 775. See also, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-95/04 
P, above n 51, para 23: 
“(w)ithin the scope of the application of Article 82 EC, a dominant undertaking is subject to 
certain limitations that do not apply to other undertakings in the same form. Because of the 
presence of the dominant undertaking, competition on the market in question is weakened. 
Therefore - whatever the causes of its dominant position – that undertaking has a particular 
responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not undermine effective and undistorted 
competition in the common market. A practice which would be unobjectionable under normal 
circumstances can be an abuse if applied by an undertaking in a dominant position.” 
This constitutes one of the main factors explaining the “divide” between Article 82 EC and Section 2 
Sherman Act; Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of 
Economics: the U.S./E.U. Divide, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 725, 728. 
59 Case T-219/99 above n 51 found that British Airways had a dominant position with a market share of 
39,7%, which was moreover declining. However, this case should be put in the context of the 
liberalization of the airways sector in the UK and the need to protect a new entrant, Virgin, from the 
incumbent monopolist, which was previously State owned. See, GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION 
LAW, 1
st ed., (2007), at 169. 
60 Michelin II above n 51, para 100 (emphasis added). 
61 Michelin II above n 51, para 109.  
  16article 82 EC. The position of the Court could be interpreted as indicating that all 
loyalty-inducing discounts are illegal per se.
62
 
The restrictive position of the Court has been slightly attenuated in British 
Airways v Commission.
63 The ECJ applied in this case a qualitative substantiality 
approach similar to that applied for exclusive dealing agreements in the United 
States
64 and balanced the exclusionary effect of the rebate system with the advantages 
it provided to the consumers in terms of efficiency.
65 The position of the Court in 
British Airways is remarkable, not only because the Court applied an anticompetitive 
foreclosure test but also because in a quite similar case involving the same parties, the 
Second US Circuit rejected Virgin’s attempted monopolization claim that British 
Airways had infringed §2 of the Sherman Act by bundling its ticket sales for 
corporate customers on routes between the UK and the US.
66 The plaintiff’s expert 
advanced a “predatory foreclosure” theory, according to which British Airways had 
priced below its own costs in certain routes by adding additional flights in order to 
deter or delay its rival Virgin’s expansion and that the costs incurred by British 
Airways were immediately recouped by setting prices substantially above costs on 
other routes.
67 The Second Circuit found that Virgin failed to bring evidence of below 
cost pricing, as inter alia the correct measure of costs was Average Avoidable Costs 
(AAC) calculated on all the British Airways routes in the geographical market (and 
not only an incremental sales test as was argued by Virgin’s expert).
68 The Second 
Circuit also refused that there was recoupment, as Virgin did not indicate how much 
above its costs British Airways priced the non-competitive routes.
69
 
 In conclusion, the Second Circuit adopted a predatory standard test, noting 
that “low prices are a positive aspect of a competitive marketplace and are encouraged 
by antitrust laws,” and considered that, “as long as low prices remain above predatory 
levels, they neither threaten competition nor give rise to an antitrust injury.” 
70 This 
test imposes a higher standard of proof to the plaintiff than the Ninth Circuit’s 
modified predatory pricing standard: according to PeaceHealth the plaintiff has to 
prove that the monopolist’s prices are below his average variable costs in the 
competitive segment of the market (and therefore not his AAC for all sales).
71  
 
                                            
62 See, John Kallaugher & Brian Sher, Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary 
Abuse under Article 82, (25)5 ECLR 263 (2004); Denis Waelbroeck, Michelin II: A Per Se Rule 
Against Rebates by Dominant Companies?, 1(1) JOCLE 149 (2005). 
63 Case T-219/99, above n 51 ; Case C-95/04 P, above n 51. Kelyn Bacon, European Court of justice 
Upholds Judgment of the Court of First Instance in the British Airways/Virgin Saga, 3(2) COMPETITION 
POLICY INT’L 227 (2007); Okeoghene Odudu, Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Commission, 
judgment of the Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 15 March 2007, 44 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 
1781 (2007). 
64 Jonathan M. Jacobson, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure and Consumer Harm, 70 ANTITRUST L. J. 
311, 322 (2002) 
65 Case C-95/04 P above n 51, para 86. 
66 Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd v British Airways above n 7. 
67  Id. at 266. 
68 Id. at 267-269. The incremental sales test examines if the incremental revenue exceeds or not 
incremental cost. If this is the case, the bundled discount is found to be legal. 
69 Id. at 271-272. 
70 Id. 269. 
71 See, our analysis above. 
  17A comparison of the antitrust standards used by both jurisdictions for bundled 
discounts shows that there is an important divergence in the dominant analogy used 
for these practices. Whereas some US courts examine these practices from the 
perspective of a modified version of a predatory pricing test, the European courts 
apply an anticompetitive foreclosure test which seems similar to that employed in 
recent exclusive dealing cases,
72 or they acknowledge, as the CFI has recently done in 
Microsoft, that bundled discounts may, in some circumstances, have an equivalent 
effect to tying.
73 However, the recent Discussion paper of the European Commission 
on Article 82 suggests a different approach for mixed bundling.
74  
 
2.2.2. The Commission’s Staff Discussion Paper on Article 82: a mixed 
predatory/foreclosure approach 
 
The Commission’s staff Discussion Paper rejects the distinction between 
quantity, loyalty and target rebates.
75 It distinguishes instead between two types of 
rebate practices: First, single-product rebate systems that have their possible negative 
effects in the market on which the undertaking concerned is dominant and are 
considered as a form of price-abuse are mainly examined under a price/cost standard 
and mixed bundling practices or bundled discounts which produce effects on other 
markets than that of the dominant undertaking or they may concern different products 
of the same market and are analyzed in the section of the Discussion Paper devoted to 
tying practices
 76, although the Commission also classifies them as a pricing abuse.
77  
 
There are two main forms of single-product rebates: unconditional rebates, 
that is, rebates granted only to particular customers but independently of their 
purchasing behavior and conditional rebates, which are rebates granted to customers 
to reward certain purchasing behavior. According to the staff discussion paper’s 
proposal, both “conditional” and “unconditional” single product rebates should be 
assessed under a predatory pricing standard. The suggested tests look to whether the 
discount practice that is offered by the dominant firm covers the average total cost 
(ATC) of supplying the sales that are open to competition. If that is not the case and 
the part of the demand to which the rebate is applied is significant enough to create a 
foreclosure effect, an abuse will be considered likely. Article 82 will thus apply 
directly only if the discount leads to the foreclosure of an equally efficient competitor. 
The staff discussion paper, however, does not rule out the possibility to take action in 
cases where the discount covers the ATC of the contestable proportion of demand 
(sales open to competition), when it appears that the new entrant may not be as 
                                            
72 Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para 157-160; Case C-
552/03 Unilever Bestfoods (Ireland) v. Commission [2006] I-9091. 
73 Case T-201/04 above n 4, para 908. Although the Court does not indicate if it will apply the same 
standard as for tying, the language used indicates that the CFI embraces the tying analogy. 
74 The Discussion paper is a consultation document, prepared by the staff of the DG Competition. It has 
not been published at the Official Journal of the European Communities and therefore does not produce 
any legal effect. It is still unclear if the Commission will follow up this consultation phase with a 
Notice or Guidelines on Article 82. 
75 On the position of the European Commission to bundled discounts and rebates having a tying effect 
before the Discussion Paper, see RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW, 4
th ed., 2001, 644-656; FAULL 
& NIKPAY, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION, 2007, §§ 4.317, 4.330-4.331.The Commission applied a 
foreclosure test and the practices were found to be either discriminatory or equivalent to tying 
practices. 
76 Id. para 142. 
77 Discussion Paper, above n 46, para 142-176. 
  18efficient as the dominant company due to certain “non-replicable advantages” or 
economies of scale and scope, learning curve effects or first mover advantages that 
later entrants cannot be expected to match even if they were able to achieve the same 
production volumes as the dominant company.
78 The standard applied seems to be 
close to a not yet as efficient as test. 
 
 The staff discussion paper’s proposals mark a shift from the current approach 
of the CFI and the ECJ on rebates, which employ the anticompetitive foreclosure 
standard and do not provide for a safe harbor for discount practices.  
 
Concerning bundled discounts (mixed bundling), the staff discussion paper 
acknowledges that these may have similar effects on competition than tying and that 
the distinction between mixed bundling and pure bundling is not “necessarily clear-
cut” as mixed bundling may come close to pure bundling when the prices charged for 
the individual offerings are high.
79 The Commission’s officials refer in some parts of 
the Discussion paper to mixed bundling as “commercial tying.”
80 In other parts of the 
Discussion paper, the DG Comp’s staff nevertheless remarks that there is a difference 
between these two practices in the sense that in mixed bundling none of the products 
is “tied in the traditional sense.”
81 For the discussion paper, both practices have 
similar foreclosure effects: Mixed bundling constitutes an indirect measure to achieve 
the same result as contractual tying “by inducing customers to purchase the tied 
product through granting bonuses, rebates, discounts or any other commercial 
advantage.”
82 It seems that, for the Commission’s staff, coercion and inducement may 
produce the same effects and therefore should be analyzed under the same standards. 
 
For bundling practices to be prohibited under Article 82, the presence of the 
following elements is usually required: (i) the company concerned is dominant in the 
tying market, (ii) the tying and tied goods are two distinct products, (iii) the tying 
practice is likely to have a market distorting foreclosure effect, (iv) the tying practice 
is not justified objectively or by efficiencies.
83 Therefore, if the practice is a bundled 
discount the antitrust standard will depend on the identification of at least two distinct 
products (the first one is the product on which market the firm has a dominant 
position and the second one is the market or product where the anticompetitive effects 
will be produced). It seems that the Discussion paper applies to mixed bundling a 
specific version of the foreclosure test that it usually applies to tying. 
 
However, the Discussion paper differentiates commercial tying and 
contractual tying when it examines the third prong of the test, the market distorting 
foreclosure effect. It is only if the discount is so large that “efficient competitors 
offering only some but not all of the components, cannot compete against the 
discounted bundle” that a bundled discount may infringe Article 82.
84 The 
Commission suggests a complex modified price/cost test (based on long run 
incremental costs) in order to identify whether the excluded competitor is as efficient 
                                            
78 Id. para 67 & 165. 
79 Id. fn 112. 
80 Id. para 182. 
81 Id. fn 113. 
82 Id., para  
83 Id. para 183. 
84 Id. para 189. 
  19as the dominant firm.
85 This test is in conformity with the position defended by the 
Commission in the Discussion paper that pricing abuses, such as mixed bundling, 
should be analyzed under the as efficient as competitor test.
86 The assumption is that 
if a price charged by the dominant company covers its incremental costs, such a price 
cannot normally be considered exclusionary, as an efficient competitor would be able 
to counteract the strategy of the dominant firm. However, the Commission’s officials 
also recognize that “it may exceptionally be concluded that although the price exceeds 
the long run incremental costs the mixed bundling nonetheless is considered 
exclusionary.”
87 This is because, as the Commission’s officials also note in the 
Discussion paper, “it may sometimes be necessary in the consumers’ interest to also 
protect competitors that are not (yet) as efficient as the dominant company.”
88 It may 
also be difficult to collect the data necessary for such a finding. In this case, the 
discussion paper suggests that “it may be possible to show that the rival was actually 
excluded or marginalized following the bundling by the dominant company” and then 
leave to the dominant undertaking “the possibility to rebut the findings by using its 
own incremental costs.”
89 The test proposed by the Commission’s officials does not 
go as far as advocating the establishment of a safe harbor for mixed bundling 
practices that conform to a price/cost standard, but it establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that these discounts do not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 
 
The test suggested by the discussion paper may be subject to the following 
two criticisms. First, it seems to be fairly complex and it would be difficult to apply in 
practice. Second, it is based on the assumption that for pricing abuses, EC competition 
law adopts the “as efficient as competitor” test. This is a questionable assumption, in 
the sense that the case law of the ECJ or the CFI on discounts and tying do not 
provide any support to this specific approach and have generally accepted that the 
exclusion by a dominant undertaking of not equally efficient rivals may be an antitrust 
issue if it leads to direct or indirect consumer detriment. If the reference to the as 
efficient as competitor test does not hold, then there is no reason left for the 
Commission to maintain a modified predatory pricing test and the applicable standard 
should be that of anticompetitive foreclosure. The application of the anticompetitive 
foreclosure test should not, however, lead to the sanction under Article 82 EC of 
discount practices that may benefit consumers. A full-blown rule of reason analysis 
that will examine possible efficiency gains and that will require a likely consumer 
detriment before any finding of abuse is therefore required. 
 
The position of the Commission’s staff is based on the speculation that the 
Discussion paper will be an opportunity to subject old and more recent case law of the 
ECJ and the CFI to critical economic analysis. Nevertheless, one may argue that there 
are also economic arguments in favor of a test that recognizes that the exclusion of 
not equally efficient rivals may produce consumer harm (which includes not just a 
loss of consumer surplus but also wealth transfers from the consumers to the 
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  20dominant firms).
90 Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Commission has made use 
of the modified predatory pricing test its staff suggested in the Discussion paper on 
recent cases on bundled discounts, as its decisions have also relied on “the previous 
case law of the European Court of Justice.”
91 This may be an implicit admission that 
the precedents of the ECJ and the CFI do not leave much space for the Commission to 
develop a test that would introduce a cost measure before analyzing the foreclosure 
effect of the practice. The ECJ in British Airways and the CFI in Microsoft have 
recently affirmed that efficiency considerations should come into play after the 
practice has been found to produce a foreclosure effect and that the evidentiary 
burden of efficiency gains should be on the dominant firm.
92 A comparative analysis 
of the efficiency of the dominant and excluded firm will have the effect of bringing 
the efficiency considerations at the first step of the analysis. However, that would be 
against the recent rulings of the European Courts on the allocation of the burden of 
proof between the parties. 
 
An additional difficulty with the test suggested in the Discussion Paper is that 
it does not make clear how mixed bundling is different from tying. This is an 
important consideration, as it seems that the equally efficient competitor test does not 
apply to tying while it would apply to mixed bundling. This raises the issue of the 
existence of an effective and practical tool to distinguish between the two practices. It 
would make no sense to have a price/cost test for mixed bundling if the same practice 
could also be analyzed under the anticompetitive foreclosure approach of tying. The 
position of antitrust law in the US and the EC on this issue is not very clear, as will 
show the analysis of the two criteria that are generally used by the case law to 
distinguish between tying and single-product discount practices and between tying 
and mixed bundling, respectively the requirements of the existence of distinct 
products and that of coercion. 
 
2.3 Distinguishing between bundled discounts and tying: the role of the distinct 
products and the “coercion” tests 
 
  The analysis of bundled discounts under a predatory pricing standard in the 
US and the Commission’s staff proposals to use a cost/price standard for rebates 
differentiate the foreclosure test applied to tying practices in the US and the EC. This 
implies that a process of characterization of the specific facts of the case as 
constituting tying or bundled discounts (mixed bundling) should precede the step of 
examining the anticompetitive effects of the practice under either the foreclosure or 
the predation-like test. One could, however, object to any distinction between the 
standard that applies to tying and that to bundled discounts or mixed bundling, and 
could advocate a common standard for both practices. Jean Tirole suggested the 
adoption for both practices of a predation standard that will include the analysis of the 
likelihood of tying to reduce competition in the tied market (step 1) the likelihood of 
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  21tying to hurt consumers (step 2), as well as a recoupment test (step 3).
93 According to 
this view, tying is a tool for non-price predation, which is defined as “a voluntary and 
temporary loss in profit that can be rationalized only through a contemplated and 
substantial increase in the rival’s probability of exit and the subsequent ability to 
recoup losses.”
94 However, this proposal is not clear as to which criterion should be 
used in order to measure loss (and the adequate measure of costs) in this 
circumstance. 
 
Remarkably, both the European Commission and the US courts that advocate 
a cost/price standard of predation for bundled discounts continue to employ a specific 
anticompetitive foreclosure standard for tying. This seems to be an inconsistent 
approach, at least if one shares the previous point of view. If a predatory cost/price 
test should be the standard for bundled discounts, the same should also be true for 
tying. However, the application of a predation test to tying practices seems to be at 
least controversial, as it will conflict with well-established case law of the Supreme 
Court and the European Courts, and has not yet been considered as an adequate policy 
option by either the European or the US antitrust authorities. 
 
Indeed, the distinct/separate product rule, which is the first step of the antitrust 
analysis of tying cases in EC and in the US, seems redundant if one adopts the same 
type of antitrust standard as in predatory pricing or single branding cases. 
Furthermore, a careful consideration of the coercion test, which is the second step of 
an antitrust claim in both jurisdictions, shows that the distinction between bundled 
discounts and tying practices is not as clear as it may first appear. 
 
2.3.1. The separate products test. What constitutes a distinct (separate) product? 
 
The judicial test for tying practices in Europe follows similar steps to that for 
tying in the Unites States. There is anticompetitive tying if (i) the tying and the tied 
products are two separate (distinct) products, (ii) the undertaking concerned is 
dominant (or has market power) in the market for the tying product (there is market 
power in the market for the tying product)
95, (iii) the undertaking concerned does not 
give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product 
(coercion) and (iv) the practice in question forecloses competition (there are 
anticompetitive effects in the tied market). The CFI also accepted in Microsoft that the 
Commission rightly examined the objective justifications of the conduct that were 
advanced by Microsoft
96 and referred to this condition as the fifth step of the 
analysis.
97 However, the step of objective justification seems to form part of the 
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  22fourth limb of the test as it helps to establish the existence of anticompetitive effects 
(anticompetitive foreclosure). 
 
The separate product test constitutes the first step of the analysis of 
anticompetitive tying for the purposes of Article 81 and 82 EC. This is also a 
requirement in the US for tying arrangements but this derives from Jefferson Parish, a 
§1 Sherman Act case and the case law does not seem to require a separate products 
test for tying under §2 of the Sherman Act.
98 The latter approach presents important 
advantages, as our analysis will demonstrate. 
 
What is the purpose of the two distinct products requirement? It has been 
suggested that its main function is to serve as a screening device in order to take into 
account apparent efficiency gains that follow from the bundling of two separate 
products.
99 Two items may be considered to be a single product for the purposes of 
the law of tying when they are subject to certain economies of joint production or 
distribution that can be achieved only if all customers can be forced to take the entire 
package. However, the ECJ suggested in Tetra Pak II that “even where tied sales of 
two products are in accordance with commercial usage or there is a natural link 
between the two products in question (therefore they are single products in the sense 
of consumer demand), such sales may still constitute abuse within the meaning of 
Article 82 unless they are objectively justified.”
100 This may indicate that even if the 
two items are considered to be a single product for the purposes of tying, it is still 
possible that Article 82 will apply if the other conditions of anticompetitive tying are 
fulfilled. This interpretation may find support in Microsoft where the CFI remarked 
that, “it is difficult to speak of commercial usage in an industry that is 95% controlled 
by Microsoft.”
101 The condition of the existence of two separate products will become 
devoid of purpose if the commercial usage is defined by the practice of a dominant 
firm in the market. It seems therefore that if this requirement applies also for the 
application of Article 82, in situations of “super dominant position”
102, such as in 
Microsoft, it is because it fulfills an additional objective than simply being a screening 
device for the efficiency of the bundling practice. 
 
The definition of what constitutes a distinct products test may shed light on the 
real function of this condition. The Commission officials advanced in the Discussion 
Paper on Article 82 and in its Microsoft decision the position that “products are 
distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, from the customers’ perspective, the 
products are or would be purchased separately.”
103 They also noted, however, that  
 
“it is not necessary that the two products belong to two separate product 
markets. In a market with differentiated products, two products may be 
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The distinct product test does not therefore necessarily constitute a relevant 
market test. The Commission’s staff relied in the Discussion paper on direct evidence 
of consumer demand, such as the fact that the consumers purchase the products 
separately, when they are given a choice, as well as indirect, such as the fact that 
firms in competitive markets tend to tie the products together. According to the CFI in 
Microsoft, the distinctness of products for the purpose of applying Article 82 EC “has 
to be assessed by reference to customer demand” and “in the absence of independent 
demand for the allegedly tied product, there can be no question of separate products 
and no abusive tying.”
105 However, in Microsoft the Commission did not only focus 
on customer demand but instead accorded equal importance to the demand and the 
supply sides of the tied product: 
 
“The distinctness of products for the purposes of an analysis under Article 82 
therefore has to be assessed with a view to consumer demand. If there is no 
independent demand for an allegedly “tied” product, then the products at issue 
are not distinct and a tying charge will be to no avail. 
 
The fact that the market provides media players separately is evidence for 
separate consumer demand for media players, distinguishable from the 
demand for client PC operating systems. There is, therefore, a separate market 
for these products. There are vendors who develop and supply media players 
on a stand-alone basis, separate from PC operating systems...”
106
 
The CFI refused Microsoft’s argument that the Commission should have 
examined instead if the tying product was regularly offered without the tied product 
or whether customers wanted Windows without media functionality. Indeed, if this 
were the test, complementary products could not constitute separate product for the 
purposes of Article 82 EC.
107  
 
The Court also noted that, “it is quite possible that customers will wish to 
obtain the products together, but from different sources.”
108 The emphasis on the 
existence of different sources of supply and, in particular, existence of competing 
suppliers of the alleged tied product was a factor that apparently influenced the 
conclusion of the Court that the Windows Operating System and WMP were distinct 
products.
109 This is in conformity with previous case law of the ECJ that “the fact that 
there are on the market independent companies specializing in the manufacture and 
sale of the tied product constitutes serious evidence of the existence of a separate 
market for that product.”
110 Although the Commission’s staff also mentions in the 
Discussion paper on Article 82 the existence of independent suppliers as indirect 
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  24evidence of a separate consumer demand, this factor does not play a decisive role in 
the inquiry on the existence of a distinct product.
111  
 
The CFI’s distinct product test seems to be more supply oriented than the staff 
discussion paper on Article 82 demand-oriented test. The approach of the Court 
makes sense if one considers this condition in light of the interpretation by the Court 
of the condition of foreclosure of competition. The Court assumed that the foreclosure 
of competitors in the specific circumstances of this case led to consumer detriment, in 
the sense that consumers’ choice and innovation were restricted. A focus on consumer 
demand, at least as this concept is perceived in defining a relevant market, simply 
does not address this type of anticompetitive harm, as it generally centers on cross-
price elasticity of demand. 
 
The CFI also noted that IT and communications industries develop rapidly and 
over time separate products might become single.
112 However, it did not take that 
statement into account in the present case as “it is by reference to the factual and 
technical situation that existed at the time when…the impugned conduct became 
harmful…” that the Court assesses the existence of distinct products.
113 However, the 
importance of consumer demand for bundled operating systems and media players, 
after Microsoft released the bundled version, shows the evolution of industry 
practice.
114 If the Court did not finally consider that this was an important factor to 
take into account, it is because of the supply-oriented character of its definition of the 
distinct product test and because of its emphasis on the exclusion of rival suppliers of 
streaming media players. This seems to constitute the main difference from the 
interpretation of this condition in US antitrust law.  
  
In US antitrust law, the tying and tied products are separate if “the tying item 
is commonly sold separately from the tied item in a well functioning market.”
115 The 
test is whether there is sufficient consumer demand in the marketplace to support 
independent markets despite any efficiencies tying may bring. The DC Circuit 
mentioned in US v. Microsoft that “perceptible separate demand is inversely 
proportional to net efficiencies.”
116 The existence on the market of independent 
companies specializing in the manufacture and sale of the tied product does not 
constitute adequate evidence of a distinct product under US antitrust law. This 
explains why in US v. Microsoft the DC Circuit found merit in Microsoft’s argument 
that, in the circumstances of the case, the consumer demand test would chill 
innovation to the detriment of consumers by preventing firms from integrating into 
their products new functionality previously provided by stand-alone products – and 
hence, by definition subject to separate consumer demand. The Circuit thus found the 
Jefferson Parish separate products test to be inappropriate: 
 
“the per se rule’s direct consumer demand and indirect industry custom 
inquiries are, as a general matter, backward-looking and therefore 
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  25systematically poor proxies for overall efficiency in the presence of new and 
innovative integration … the direct consumer demand test focuses on historic 
consumer behavior, likely before integration and the indirect industry custom 
test look at firms that, unlike the defendant, may not have integrated the tying 
and the tied goods. Both tests compare incomparables – the defendant’s 
decision to bundle in the presence of integration, on the one hand, and 
consumer and competitor calculations in its absence, on the other. Because 
one cannot be sure beneficial integration will be protected by the other 
elements of the per se rule, simple application of that rule’s separate-products 
test may make consumers worse off.”
117
 
However, the position of the CFI in Microsoft can hardly be explained by the 
objective to protect innovation on the market. If this were the case, the CFI should 
have balanced the benefits, from the point of view of the consumers, of having a new 
integrated product and the costs of the immediate reduction of consumer choice that 
the bundling of the alleged “distinct products” would have brought. This test could 
essentially be performed under the last step of the analysis of tying in the US and the 
EC: the analysis of anticompetitive effects (foreclosure of competition). The negative 
effects on consumers should be balanced against efficiency gains that would be 
passed on to consumers in the form of new products or better quality. The existence of 
a full rule of reason test for technological tying in the US makes possible the full 
consideration of these efficiencies without necessarily applying the distinct products 
test. The decision of the DC Circuit in Microsoft to abandon this condition was an 
immediate consequence of its decision to adopt a rule of reason instead of a per se 
rule approach. The DC Circuit thus seemed to share the view that the separate product 
test is essentially an obvious and significant efficiency inquiry, a position defended by 
Justice O’ Connor in her dissenting opinion in Jefferson Parish and by judge Posner 
of the Seventh Circuit. 
 
The fact that the CFI adopted a supply-oriented definition of the distinct 
product test in Microsoft could therefore indicate that the main focus of the enquiry is 
to establish if competitors could viably (profitably) operate in the tied product market. 
This is relatively easy to prove as the existence in the tied product market of 
companies that offer only the tied product indicates that there is sufficient consumer 
demand for the tied product (without the tying product) and therefore that the two 
products are distinct. It is also clear that a modified per se illegality test applies for 
tying in EC competition law. There is no point of having a distinct product test if the 
benefits of the single product for the consumers would in any case be examined in the 
next step of the analysis under a rule of reason standard.
118
 
 One could nevertheless object to this interpretation that an optimal allocation 
of the burden of proof between the plaintiff and the defendant would require that the 
former brings evidence of the absence of any obvious efficiency gains in bundling the 
products as well as of an anticompetitive effect, before the burden of proof moves to 
the dominant firm. The later should in this case substantiate other efficiency 
justifications that would balance the anticompetitive effects of the practice. This 
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  26interpretation is valid only if one considers that the distinct product test focuses on 
consumer demand and operates as a proxy for examining the obvious and significant 
efficiencies that the single product would bring to consumers. However, this 
interpretation does not fit well with the CFI’s position that the existence of 
independent suppliers of the alleged tied product indicates that there are two distinct 
products. Consequently, if the CFI adopted the distinct product rule as the first step of 
its assessment of bundling, it is because of its emphasis on the foreclosure of rivals 
from the tied market as a proxy for anticompetitive effects. This explains why the CFI 
did not focus only on identifying an independent consumer demand for the tied 
product but also considered as important evidence of the existence of distinct products 
the fact that there were on the market independent companies specializing in the 
manufacture and sale of the tied product. The distinct product test is therefore 
intrinsically linked to the CFI’s specific approach in interpreting the requirement of 
anticompetitive foreclosure, an issue to be examined in the following section. 
 
The Commission’s staff Discussion paper on Article 82 employs also the 
requirement of distinct products in order to distinguish single branding obligations 
from bundled discounts and mixed bundling strategies. Rebates that are applied by a 
dominant company for a particular product and have their possible negative effects in 
the market where the firm is dominant are considered under the rubric of “single 
branding and rebates” and are subject to a variety of tests, including a predatory 
cost/price standard for certain types of unconditional rebates. On the contrary, single 
branding obligations and rebates that have effects in other markets are considered as a 
form of tying/bundling. This implies, as was previously mentioned, that the existence 
of distinct products will lead to the analysis of the practice under the tying/bundling 
rubric rather than under the single branding one. 
 
One could compare this approach with that followed by the DC Circuit in U.S. 
v. Microsoft, when it examined the price bundling claim of Windows and Internet 
Explorer.
119 According to the D.C. Circuit, in case of a valid allegation of a price 
bundling claim,
120 the plaintiffs should demonstrate that  
 
“the anti-competitive effects of Microsoft’s price bundling outweigh any 
procompetitive justifications the company provides for it. In striking this 
balance, the District Court should consider, among other things, indirect 
evidence of efficiency provided by the ‘competitive fringe’. Although this 
inquiry may overlap with the separate-products screen under the per se rule, 
that is not its role here…thus, the separate-products inquiry serves merely to 
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  27 This is essentially an anticompetitive foreclosure test.
122 The distinct product 
rule could thus indicate the applicable antitrust standard, if single product rebates and 
tying/bundling are subject to a different form of antitrust assessment. The utility of the 
distinct product requirement will however be limited if the same antitrust standards 
apply to both of these practices. As it is also clear from the position of the DC circuit 
on price bundling, the success of such a claim requires evidence that competing 
suppliers of the alleged tying product do not sell the bundled (tying and tied) product 
“exclusively at a bundled price.”
123 The fact that the firms at the competitive fringe 
were able to offer an unbundled version of the tying product at a lower price than the 
bundled version would indicate that the two products can profitably be offered 
separately and consequently that “at least” for these rivals, the efficiency gains from 
bundling would “be outweighed by those from separate choice.”
124 That finding 
would also indicate that offering a bundled version is a direct impediment to 
consumer choice.
125 The Court does not explain however, if this (more supply-
oriented) separate product test dismisses the need to prove coercion, which is a 
requirement for bringing a tying claim and how the rule of reason will apply in this 
case. 
 
2.3.2. The “coercion” test 
 
It is a common feature in EC and US antitrust law that bundling of two distinct 
products does not constitute tying unless there has been an effective limitation of the 
consumers’ choice (or coercion) to purchase the products separately.  
 
In EC competition law, there is a tying violation if the undertaking concerned 
does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product. 
“Coercion” may arise from the refusal of the dominant firm to sell the tying product 
without the tied one, either as a contractual clause or de facto, from the unavailability 
of the products separately, from pressure exerted on the customer through the promise 
of favorable treatment to customers who take both products or threats to those who do 
not, or from pricing incentives which may be so powerful that no rational customer 
would choose to buy the products separately.
126 In Microsoft, the CFI considered that 
the consumers were unable to acquire the Windows client PC operating system 
without simultaneously acquiring Windows Media Player (WMP) and assumed that 
the requirement of Article 82(d) EC, that the conclusion of contracts is made subject 
to acceptance of supplementary obligations, was satisfied in this case.  
 
The CFI took the view that the analysis of whether the dominant undertaking 
does not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product, 
is “merely expressing in different words the concept that bundling assumes that 
                                            
122 In examining the anticompetitive effect of the price bundling, the Court affirmed that “there is no 
claim of price predation,” thus indicating that price predation is a separate claim than “price bundling.” 
It follows that there is no need to bring evidence that the price of the bundle is lower than a specific 
measure of costs to bring a “price bundling” claim. 
123 Id. at 97. 
124 Id. 
125 For an analysis of Microsoft’s pro-competitive justifications in employing a zero-price bundling of 
Internet Explorer with Windows see, Benjamin Klein, Microsoft’s use of zero price bundling to fight 
the “browser wars,” in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN 
THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 217 (eds. Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard, 1999). 
126 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, above n 24, at 410-415. 
  28consumers are compelled, directly or indirectly, to accept supplementary obligations 
such as those referred to in Article 82(d) EC.”
127 It also held that the Commission was 
right to rely in its decision on Article 82 in its entirety and not exclusively on Article 
82(d) EC.
128 Indeed, the test in Article 82 is not exhaustive.
129
 
The coercion here was applied primarily to the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) and it was both contractual and technical in nature. First, it was 
not possible for the OEMs to obtain a license on the Windows operating system 
without WMP. Second, it was not technically possible for the OEMs to uninstall 
WMP. However, the CFI also noted that coercion of OEMs indirectly restricted the 
choice of the end consumers.
130 The approach of the Court is less clear with regard to 
the first argument of Microsoft, that customers were not required to pay anything 
extra for WMP. The Court rejected this argument by noting that the price of WMP 
was included in this case in the total price of the Windows client PC operating system. 
This argument seems paradoxical since the Court had already accepted that the two 
products were distinct and should have therefore examined Microsoft’s arguments 
from that perspective. 
 
The CFI also adopted a broad definition of what constitutes coercion stating 
that, “neither Article 82(d) nor the case-law on bundling requires that consumers must 
be forced to use the tied product or prevented from using the same product supplied 
by a competitor of the dominant undertaking.”
131 The theoretical possibility that 
consumers were not prevented from installing and using other media players instead 
of WMP was not enough for the CFI to conclude that there was no coercion as end 
consumers had a strong incentive to use WMP.
132
 
The requirement of coercion is not mentioned in the Discussion paper on 
Article 82 for bundling/tying practices. The Commission’s staff retain instead the 
following four criteria for the application of the bundling test:  
 
“… (i) the company concerned is dominant in the tying market; (ii) the tying 
and tied goods are two distinct products; (iii) the tying practice is likely to 
have a market distorting foreclosure effect; (iv) the tying practice is not 
justified objectively or by efficiencies.”
133
 
One of the reasons explaining the omission of the coercion test is that the 
Commission examines together mixed bundling and tying practices and considers 
mixed bundling as a form of “commercial tying.” The main difference between tying 
and mixed bundling is therefore the form of the restriction of choice of consumers to 
obtain the tying product without the tied product. In contractual and technical tying, 
coercion takes a direct form, while for mixed bundling, coercion is indirect and often 
takes the form of an inducement of the customers to purchase the tied product through 
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  29granting bonuses, rebates, discounts or any other commercial advantage. However, 
the Commission distinguishes the two forms of bundling when it examines the 
foreclosure effect of these practices, as it advocates a cost/price measure for mixed 
bundling practices. 
 
The requirement of coercion is also broadly interpreted in the United States. 
The buyer must somehow be forced to accept the tied product. According to Herbert 
Hovenkamp,  
 
this coercion should result from (1) an absolute refusal to sell the tying 
product without the tied product, (2) a discount, rebate or other financial 
incentive given to buyers who also take the tied product; (3) technological 




Coercion does not cover only contractual or technological tying but also 
situations of commercial tying. This does not fit well with the recent Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Cascades v PeaceHealth where the Court distinguished bundled discounts 
and tying practices and the antitrust standards that apply to them, based on the fact 
that tying requires evidence of coercion while this is not the case for bundled 
discounts: 
 
“one difference between traditional tying by contract and tying via package 
discounts is that the traditional tying contract typically forces the buyer to 
accept both products, as well as the cost savings…Conversely, the package 
discount gives the buyer the choice of accepting the cost savings by 
purchasing the package, or foregoing the savings by purchasing the products 
separately. The package discount thus does not constrain the buyer’s choice as 
much as the traditional tie. For that reason…a variation of the requirement that 
prices be below cost is essential for the plaintiff to establish one particular 
element of unlawful bundled discounting – namely, that there was actually 
tying – that is, that the purchaser was actually coerced (in this case by lower 
prices) into taking the tied-up package.”
135
 
When the Ninth Circuit examined the same facts under the tying claim, the 
Court included financial incentives as a form of coercion that could be attacked as 
unlawful tying, if their effect was to coerce the customers to buy the tying and the tied 
product. Persuasion by financial incentives and coercion have similar effects and the 
Ninth Circuit was quick to find that “there is no doubt that PeaceHealth’s practice of 
giving a larger discount to insurers who dealt with it as an exclusive preferred 
provider may have coerced some insurers to purchase primary and secondary services 
from PeaceHealth rather than from McKenzie.”
136 The Ninth Circuit noted that “the 
fact that a customer would end up paying higher prices to purchase the tied products 
separately does not necessarily create a fact issue on coercion” and “additional 
evidence of economic coercion” is required.
137 Although “not dispositive evidence of 
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  30an illegal tie,” the fact that McKenzie’s prices for primary and secondary services 
were lower than PeaceHealth’s prices on those services was considered by the Court 
as constituting a “permissible inference that a rational customer would not purchase 
PeaceHealth’s allegedly overpriced product in the absence of a tie” and therefore that 
if customers agreed on an exclusive relationship with PeaceHealth, it is because they 
were coerced by the latter.
138
 
One may argue that if coercion could also be established by evidence of 
economic incentives, which have the potential to induce a rational consumer to buy 
the tying and the tied product, there is little difference between a tying and a bundled 
discount claim. The problem is also recognized by the Ninth Circuit, which accepts 
that economic coercion through inducement could be an alternative theory for 
McKenzie to present its tying claim. The Ninth Circuit noted that  
 
“…such a claim might raise the question of whether, to establish the coercion 
element of a tying claim through a bundled discount, McKenzie must prove 
that PeaceHealth priced below a relevant measure of its costs. Some 
commentators would require a plaintiff alleging that a bundled discount 
amounts to an illegal tie to prove below-cost prices. It is unclear whether the 
AMC intended its three-part test to apply when a plaintiff alleging an illegal 
tying arrangement asserts that the defendant’s pricing practices coerced 
unwanted purchases of the tied product … The parties have not briefed this 
issue to us, and the parties did not raise the issue before the district court. We 
therefore leave it to the district court, if necessary to decide the issue in the 
first instance on remand.”
139
 
This demonstrates the internal contradiction of the Court’s decision: how is it 
possible to think that coercion distinguishes tying from bundled discounts while 
considering, at the same time, that bundled discounts may constitute a form of 
coercion? Furthermore, should financial coercion be interpreted as covering only 
situations where “the pricing structure makes purchase of the tying and tied products 
together the only viable economic option” or is this standard “too extreme”?
140 The 
Ninth Circuit’s adoption of a different antitrust standard for bundled discounts and for 
tying practices is based on shaky grounds both in terms of law and policy. As this is 
well explained by the Ninth Circuit: adopting the modified predatory cost/price 
standard for bundled discounts implies the abandonment of the anticompetitive 
foreclosure test for all exclusionary practices, such as tying and exclusive dealing, for 
a cost/price predatory test. Legal precedent, economic analysis, and policy choices 
constitute the main obstacles to this evolution.
141 As such re-design of the antitrust 
standards for exclusionary practices seems normatively undesirable and practically 
difficult, if not impossible, in view of strong judicial precedent, the application of the 
foreclosure test for bundled discounts seems to be the best alternative standard. 
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3. The different meaning of anticompetitive foreclosure in US antitrust and EC 
competition law 
 
The competitive assessment of bundling practices requires the analysis of the 
foreclosure of competition in the tying or tied market (depending on the theory of 
anticompetitive harm) in both EC and US antitrust law. The meaning of the concept 
of anticompetitive foreclosure has been, and still is, one of the most controversial 
issues in antitrust law enforcement, not only for bundling but also for all types of 
exclusionary practices. An important aspect of this debate has been the definition of a 
limiting principle for antitrust law enforcement that would perceive anticompetitive 
foreclosure as requiring something more than foreclosure or exclusion of a 
competitor. For bundling practices, the debate over the adequate standard of 
foreclosure has been over the following two questions: (i) should the foreclosure 
effect be presumed from the nature of the bundling practice?, and (ii) in which 
circumstances does the foreclosure of a competitor from the tied product market 
constitute anticompetitive foreclosure? 
 
3.1. Foreclosure and the nature of bundling: a quasi-per se rule or a more 
flexible standard? 
 
Framing competition law standards in conformity with the anticompetitive 
effects of commercial practices has been a consistent trend in modern competition 
law, not only in the United States but also in Europe. One may distinguish effects-
based approaches from form-based approaches in competition law: the former require 
the examination of the effects of a practice before concluding that it is anticompetitive 
while the later focus on the nature of the practice before arriving to any conclusion 
with regard to its anticompetitive effects. A form-based approach is not necessarily 
incompatible with the analysis of the anticompetitive effects of a practice. However, 
instead of analyzing the effects of the specific practice within the specific market 
context (an ex post and in concreto analysis), the competition authority or the judge 
characterize the practice as falling within an ex ante pre-defined category of practices 
which are generally deemed, from previous practical experience or because of a 
conflict with some fundamental aims of competition law, to produce anticompetitive 
effects (in abstracto analysis).  
 
The US and EC competition law on tying and bundling practices illustrate the 
evolution of antitrust standards towards a more effects-based approach. Although 
judicial decisions were often developed without much concern in analyzing 
anticompetitive effects the more recent case law in the US requires the examination of 
the anticompetitive effects of the practice before concluding whether there is an 
illegal tying. In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court adopted a modified per se test 
for contractual tying that emphasized foreclosure and the degree to which a tie-in 
denies market access to rivals.
142 There was a presumption of anticompetitive effects 
whenever a firm with market power employed bundling practices that had the effect 
of foreclosing rivals from significant market shares in the tied product market or of 
erecting barriers to entry. In US v. Microsoft, the DC Circuit moved to a rule of reason 
test for software bundles that requires from plaintiffs to demonstrate that the benefits 
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  32of the tying practice are outweighed by the harms in the tied product market.
143 This is 
essentially a cost-benefit analysis test that takes fully into account the efficiency gains 
to the benefit of consumers and allocates the legal burden of proof to the plaintiff as 
the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct 
outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”
144 However, it is on the defendant monopolist 
to “proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct” if “a plaintiff successfully 
establishes a prima facie case under §2 by demonstrating anticompetitive effect” 
(evidentiary burden of proof or efficiency justifications). Then “the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff to rebut that claim” and if the claim stays unrebutted to prove that “the 
anticompetitive harm outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”
145 This cost-benefit 
analysis test also applies to bundled discounts.
146 In essence, the anticompetitive 
foreclosure test in the US looks to the anticompetitive effects of the practice and 
concludes that there is anticompetitive foreclosure only when the costs are not 
outweighed by the benefits to the consumers. 
 
EC competition law was initially hostile to tying.
147 In Hilti and Tetra Pak II 
the ECJ applied a per se test and found that by imposing on their customers numerous 
obligations that had “no link with the purpose of the contracts,” the dominant firms in 
question had restricted the market access of their competitors and had deprived 
consumers of any freedom to make their own choice.
 148 It results from this case law 
that if there are independent producers on the tied product market, EC competition 
law requires the dominant undertaking to abstain from any conduct, such as 
contractual tying that would have the effect of restricting the freedom of these 
independent producers to compete on the tied market. Dominant undertakings may 
claim an objective justification of their conduct, but this concept has been restrictively 
interpreted as not including any efficiency defense but only broad non-economic 




 There are two steps in the abuse control of Article 82:  
 
“Article [82] covers practices which are likely to affect the structure of a 
market where, as a direct result of the presence of the undertakings in 
question, competition has already been weakened, and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in 
products or services based on traders’ performance, have the effect of 
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  33hindering the maintenance or development of the level of competition still 
existing on the market.”
150
 
The abuse test involves first the step of characterization of the conduct as 
being a type of conduct “likely” or “such as” to affect the structure of an otherwise 
concentrated market and which constitutes a (business) method “different from those 
governing normal competition in products or services based on traders’ performance” 
(in abstracto analysis). The competition authority or judge will examine, in a second 
step, the anticompetitive effects of the practice (in concreto analysis).
151 The first limb 
of this test implies that for certain practices there would be a presumption of 
anticompetitive or pro-competitive effect if the firm has a dominant position, as it will 
not make sense to have a two-part test otherwise. However, it is not clear what the 
Court meant by “methods different from those governing normal competition in 
products or services based on traders’ performance,” what we will characterize, for 
the sake of our argument, as “abnormal” practices. 
 
 The concept may be explained by the ordo-liberal idea that dominant firms 
have a special responsibility in preserving competition.
152 Their commercial freedom 
is therefore restricted in comparison to non-dominant undertakings. The latter remain 
free to use commercial practices that are different from those governing normal 
competition. The focus of the test seems to be the protection of “free competition” or 
“complete competition” and “open markets.”
153 The underlying theoretical 
assumption is that rivalry brings variety in the marketplace, in the sense that 
entrepreneurs test a certain number of hypotheses on the bundles of parameters of the 
“product” (price, quality, services and so on), which they think will satisfy 
consumers’ wants; Variety preserves ultimately the choice of the consumers and their 
ability to test the solutions adopted by the entrepreneurs.
154 The variety of “products” 
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  34(or solutions suggested by the entrepreneurs) would not therefore be the outcome of 
the “natural” selection process of the marketplace, but the outcome of the “artificial 
selection” of formal and informal institutions that “channel the competitive process 
and give it a certain direction,” thus selecting “at the same time, artificially, which 
entrepreneurial hypotheses will survive.”
155 Dominant firms are in a position to 
influence directly the market activities of other economic agents and therefore may 
constitute an informal institution that can indirectly affect the ultimate choice of the 
consumers. Their freedom of action is therefore restricted to “performance 
competition,” offering better terms to consumers, and does not extend to “impediment 
competition,” such as loyalty rebates, predatory pricing etc, that would hinder the 
ability of rivals to compete, in other words, to offer their own set of solutions to the 
essential problem of productive activity: what “products” do the consumers prefer?
156
 
The difficulty with this approach is to identify the practices that are deemed 
“abnormal,” as in theory there is a great variety of commercial practices that may 
have potentially the effect of excluding rivals from the market or of substantially 
hindering their ability to compete.
157 The test is unworkable if there is no limiting 
principle that will make possible for the dominant undertakings to identify ex ante if 
their commercial practices are incompatible with competition on the merits and will 
therefore will examined under the second limb of the test. One could also interpret the 
first limb of the test as covering all practices that are likely (not just capable of) to 
exclude rivals from the market, a test that would require more than just establishing 
the mere probability of exclusion and would resemble to a balance of probabilities 
test.
158 Nevertheless, distinguishing the practices that, on a balance of probabilities 
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  35following an in asbtracto analysis, are likely to produce such an effect from those that 
are not likely to achieve exclusion is still an unclear test. 
 
The case law on tying and loyalty rebates seems also to conflict with the more 
flexible position adopted by the ECJ in Oscar Bronner on refusals to supply. In this 
case, the Court took a restrictive view of the obligation of a dominant undertaking to 
grant access to its facilities to its competitors, compared to the previous case law.
159 
Bronner, a publisher of a newspaper in Austria had refused access to a competing 
newspaper to the nationwide home-delivery scheme it had established. The Court 
stressed that the refusal “must be likely to eliminate all competition” on the part of the 
competitor requesting access, that access should be indispensable and not only make 
it harder for the requesting undertaking to compete and that it should not be capable 
of being objectively justified.
160 With regard to the indispensability condition, the 
Court held that access would have been indispensable only if it was not economically 
viable to create a home-delivery system for a newspaper with a comparable 
circulation to the dominant firm’s.
161 One could argue that the conditions in Bronner 
set the outer boundaries of the special responsibility of a dominant firm and 
consequently of the corresponding duty, under Article 82, to abstain from any action 
that would be likely to exclude rivals from the market. The excluded rival would be 
granted access only if it would be impossible for an undertaking with a comparable 
output to the dominant firm to develop such facility, which indicates that the Court 
applied a not yet as efficient as test. 
 
Drawing on this case law, Jean-Yves Art and Gregory McCurdy argued that 
the Microsoft bundling case could be re-interpreted as a refusal to supply case and 
that it should be examined in conformity with the limiting principles of Bronner.
162 
They claim that the main issue involved in the bundling part of the Microsoft case is 
that by offering to OEM only a bundled version of Windows and WMP, Microsoft 
had effectively denied to its competitors in the media player market access to the 
appropriate “distribution services” of the OEMs (the OEMs would operate in this case 
as intermediaries between the market players on the tied product market and the final 
consumers). However, access to the OEMs was necessary to maintain competition in 
the media player market. Their argument was that the application of the Bronner 
principles in the factual situation of Microsoft would not have led to an infringement 
of Article 82, as distribution of the player in Windows was not indispensable and that 
Internet downloading was a feasible and only “less advantageous” distribution 
channel. 
 
There are at least two objections to this conclusion. First, even if the Bronner 
conditions applied in this case, it is uncertain that they would not have led to the 
finding of an infringement, as indispensability is measured with reference to the 
possibility of creating an economically viable distribution channel. It remains to be 
seen if Internet downloading could be considered as an economically viable 
alternative to access to the Original Equipment Manufacturers in order to bring the 
                                            
159 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v. Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791. 
160 Id. para 41. 
161 Id. para 45-46. 
162 Jean-Yves Art & Gregory S. McCurdy, The European Commission’s media player remedy in its 
Microsoft decision: compulsory code removal despite the absence of tying or foreclosure, 25(11) 
ECLR 694, 703-707 (2004) 
  36product to the attention of the final consumers. Second, in Bronner the dominant firm 
was refusing access to a facility it owned and which was the product of its own 
investment and efforts.
163 The refusal to access was therefore a legitimate exercise of 
the undertaking’s property rights. On the contrary, if we follow Art’s and McCurdy’s 
arguments, Microsoft’s refusal to supply access to the “distribution services” of the 
OEMs to its rivals could not be considered as the legitimate exercise of a property 
right for the simple reason that the OEMs were not owned by Microsoft.
164 One could 
thus advance the following limiting principle of the doctrine of exclusion in EC 
competition law: exclusionary unilateral commercial practices that are no more than a 
legitimate exercise of a property right are not considered as being “abnormal 
practices” and are therefore legal, unless they may have the effect to exclude an 
hypothetically efficient rival (or a not yet as efficient rival) from the market when 
access is indispensable for that rival to be able to carry on his activities in the 
downstream market and there is no actual or potential substitute for it.
165 Moreover, 
the refusal must be incapable of objective justification. In all other circumstances, 
foreclosing competitors’ access to distribution channels is presumed as likely to affect 
the structure of the market and to hinder competition, absent any objective 
justification.
166 This is how one can interpret the dicta of the CFI in Michelin II that 
 
“…for the purposes of applying Article 82 EC, establishing the anti-
competitive object and the anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing. 
If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a 
dominant position is to limit competition, that conduct will also be liable to 
have such an effect.”
167
 
The comparative analysis of the Michelin II and the British Airways’ rebates 
cases provides an example of how a form-based approach is different from a more 
effects-based test. In Michelin II, the CFI spent a number of paragraphs in examining 
if the specific target rebate scheme could be characterized as loyalty inducing. This 
characterization did not require from the Court an analysis of the concrete effects of 
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  37this specific scheme to consumers. This was not the purpose of the enquiry as it forms 
part of the second limb of the abuse test, which relates to the analysis of 
anticompetitive effects. Instead, the CFI conducted an in abstracto analysis of the 
facts of the case in order to find out if the quantity rebate system, put in place by 
Michelin, fitted the characterization of “loyalty inducing” rebates.
168 The CFI 
considered that quantity rebates that are justified by a “countervailing advantage,” that 
is “economically justified,” do not constitute in general loyalty inducing rebates and 
that they therefore escape the prohibition of Article 82.
169 However, this was not the 
case here as the Court subjected this economic justification of the rebate to a high 
standard of proof.
170 In the absence of an objective justification, the CFI concluded 
that the rebate system was loyalty inducing.
171 “Because” of its loyalty-inducing 
character the quantity rebate scheme “limited the dealers’ choice of supplier and made 
access to the market more difficult for competitors.”
172 The anticompetitive effect of 
this practice was thus presumed from the simple characterization of the rebate scheme 
as loyalty inducing without any analysis of anticompetitive effects and possible 
consumer detriment. One could compare this approach to a quasi-per se illegality test 
for loyalty-inducing rebates. 
 
The position of the CFI, this time confirmed by the ECJ, seems to have 
slightly evolved in British Airways. The CFI referred to the Michelin II case and 
considered that 
 
“It can be deduced from that case-law generally that any fidelity-building 
rebate system applied by an undertaking in a dominant position tends to 
prevent customers from obtaining supplies from competitors, in breach of 
Article 82 EC, irrespective of whether the rebate system is discriminatory. The 
same applies to a fidelity-building performance reward scheme practiced by a 
purchaser in a dominant position in relation to its suppliers of services.”
 173  
 
However, the Court also added that even if the specific schemes had a “fidelity 
–building” effect, they could escape the application of Article 82 if they were based 
on an “economically justified consideration.”
174 It would indeed be possible for the 
dominant undertaking to justify these fidelity-inducing rebates by referring to 
efficiency justifications.
175 It is remarkable that the consideration of the existence of 
objective economic justifications does not take place in order to determine whether 
the rebate scheme has a loyalty inducing effect, as it was the case in Michelin II, but 
follows the characterization step of the rebate scheme as having a fidelity-building 
character.
176 Moreover, it can include countervailing efficiency gains which benefit 
consumers.
177 In conclusion, in British Airways the CFI considered that the loyalty 
rebates schemes should not be examined under the first limb of the abuse test and that 
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  38the competition assessment should include an analysis of their anticompetitive effects, 
under the second limb of the test. This is closer to a structured rule of reason approach 
than to a quasi-per se illegality rule. The ECJ confirmed the approach of the CFI and 
adopted a formulation of the test that resembles to a structured rule of reason 
approach: 
 
“It has to be determined whether the exclusionary effect arising from such a 
system, which is disadvantageous for competition, may be counterbalanced, or 
outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the 
consumer. If the exclusionary effect of that system bears no relation to 
advantages for the market and consumers, or if it goes beyond what is 




In contrast to Michelin II, the Court also referred to the existence in this case 
of a consumer prejudice, which is an indication that it placed its analysis under the 
second limb of the abuse test.
179 The consideration of anticompetitive effects 
constitutes the main difference between the decision of the CFI in Michelin II and that 
of the ECJ in British Airways. However, as we will examine in the next section, 
examining the existence of exclusionary effects does not necessarily mean that 
evidence of anticompetitive effects and consumer detriment is required. In other 
words, the analysis of possible economic justifications of a discount with a fidelity-
building effect, does not necessarily amount to the adoption of an effects-based 
approach. 
 
In Microsoft, the European Commission was constrained in its choice of the 
adequate antitrust standard by hostility to dominant firms imposing a tie, following 
the Hilti and Tetra Pak II cases. However, instead of basing its decision on the 
traditional theory of tying, which advocates a quasi per se illegality test if there is 
evidence of foreclosure, the Commission proceeded to the second limb of the abuse 
test: 
 
“(t)here are indeed circumstances relating to the tying of WMP which warrant 
a closer examination of the effects that tying has on competition in this case. 
While in classical tying cases, the Commission and the Courts considered the 
foreclosure effect for competing vendors to be demonstrated by the bundling 
of a separate product with the dominant product, in the case at issue, users can 
and do to a certain extent obtain third party media players through the Internet, 
sometimes for free. There are therefore indeed good reasons not to assume 
without further analysis that tying WMP constitutes conduct which by its very 
nature is liable to foreclose competition.”
180
 
The Commission effectuated therefore in this case a structured rule of reason 
approach by examining the anticompetitive effects of the practice, the efficiency 
justifications argued by Microsoft and Microsoft’s incentives to foreclose, before 
concluding that Microsoft’s conduct infringed Article 82 EC.  
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  39The CFI accepted the position of the Commission but uses language that limits 
the scope of the structured rule of reason approach in situations of technological tying. 
The Court mentioned that, “while it is true that neither the provision nor, more 
generally, Article 82 EC as a whole contains any reference to the anticompetitive 
effect of bundling, the fact remains that, in principle, conduct will be regarded as 
abusive only if it is capable of restricting competition.”
181 This may be interpreted as 
indicating that the Court will focus its analysis of bundling in general (including 
contractual tying) on the second limb of the abuse test and will always examine the 
existence of anticompetitive effects. However, the Court also referred to the Michelin 
II case,
182 in order to substantiate this point, which is a case where, as previously 
mentioned, the CFI took the position that “establishing the anti-competitive object and 
the anti-competitive effect are one and the same thing.”
183 The CFI could have 
referred to the British Airways cases, to substantiate this specific position but it didn’t 
do so. It is reminded that the CFI and the ECJ did not apply in British Airways a 
quasi-per se illegality test and employed instead a structured rule of reason approach. 
They also used a slightly different terminology than the CFI in Michelin II.
184 The 
following paragraph of the Microsoft decision also indicates the ambivalence of the 
CFI’s approach with regard to the applicable antitrust standard for tying: 
 
“…the applicant cannot claim that the Commission relied on a new and highly 
speculative theory to reach the conclusion that a foreclosure effect exists in the 
present case. As indicated at recital 841 to the contested decision, the 
Commission considered that, in light of the specific circumstances of the 
present case, it could not merely assume, as it normally does in cases of 
abusive tying, that the tying of a specific product and a dominant product has 
by its nature a foreclosure effect. The Commission therefore examined more 
closely the actual effects which the bundling had already had on the streaming 




It seems therefore that the CFI accepted the structured rule of reason approach 
of the Commission, with regard to technological tying, but maintained its previous 
quasi per se illegality approach for all other forms of bundling (essentially contractual 
tying). In the French version of the same paragraph the CFI even uses the expression 
“effet d’exclusion sur le marché per se” (bundling of two products by a dominant 
undertaking leads to an exclusionary effect per se) when it refers to the “normal” 
approach for abusive tying cases. 
 
In conclusion, in examining the existence of the fourth step of a tying claim,
186 
the CFI did not presume that there was foreclosure of competition from the simple 
fact that a dominant undertaking tied two distinct products with the consequence that 
competitors were foreclosed but had to examine if the foreclosure of competitors led 
to anticompetitive effects and if there were objective justifications (efficiencies). It 
seems therefore that the analysis of objective (or efficiency) justifications constitutes 
                                            
181 Case T-201/04, above n 4, para 867. 
182 Case T-203/01 above n 51, para. 239. 
183 Id. para 241. 
184 On this point, see our next Section. 
185 Case T-201/04, above n 4, para 868 (emphasis added). 
186 Id. para 852 referring to para 842. 
  40a necessary complement to the analysis of the existence of an anticompetitive 
foreclosure. This seems to introduce implicitly a structured rule of reason approach 
for technological tying. The CFI also provided indications on the way efficiencies will 
be included in the fourth step of the competition assessment of tying and on the 
allocation of the burden of proof: 
 
“…although the burden of proof of the existence of the circumstances that 
constitute an infringement of Article 82 EC is borne by the Commission, it is 
for the dominant undertaking concerned, and not for the Commission, before 
the end of the administrative procedure, to raise any plea of objective 
justification and to support it with arguments and evidence. It then falls to the 
Commission, where it proposes to make a finding of an abuse of a dominant 
position, to show that the arguments and evidence relied on by the undertaking 




The CFI seems to distinguish between the legal burden of proof that is borne 
by the plaintiff and the evidentiary burden of proof of objective justifications that is 
borne by the defendant. If the defendant “raises” these objective justifications, it is on 
the plaintiff to “show” that these cannot be accepted. However, there are important 
differences between US antitrust law and EC competition law with regard to the 
analysis of the anticompetitive effects, despite the fact that anticompetitive 
foreclosure constitutes the focus of the competitive assessment in both jurisdictions. 
 
3.2. When does the foreclosure of a competitor produce anticompetitive effects? 
 
The proof of the existence of anticompetitive foreclosure requires an analysis 
of the concrete effects of the practice adopted by the alleged monopolist (or dominant 
firm). This implies the analysis of how the specific practice may affect consumers. 
The exclusion or foreclosure of competitors is not sufficient to substantiate a claim of 
anticompetitive foreclosure.
188 Something more is required. This is an assertion to 
which both EC and US antitrust law would agree, at least for technological tying. 
There is, however, a significant divergence between the EC and the US approach with 
regard to which are these additional elements to the foreclosure of competitors that 
may substantiate a finding of anticompetitive foreclosure (or anticompetitive effects) 
and therefore of a competition law infringement. The role of objective (or efficiency) 
justifications was examined in the previous section. We will now focus our analysis 
on the two additional elements of anticompetitive foreclosure, that is: the 
anticompetitive harm story and the existence of a consumer detriment. 
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  41The denial of market access to rivals does not constitute by itself evidence of 
anticompetitive foreclosure, but only a starting point for the analysis of exclusionary 
abuses. Both EC and US antitrust law require an anticompetitive harm story that will 
link the exclusion of the competitors to the existence of a consumer detriment or to 
that of a negative consumer welfare effect.  
 
An important difference between the two jurisdictions is that leveraging 
constitutes an anticompetitive harm story that is widely accepted in Europe while it 
seems to be controversial in the United States. Anticompetitive leveraging was one of 
the main theories of harm advanced by the Commission in the Microsoft case.
189 The 
CFI also relied on the same theory of anticompetitive harm
190 and confirmed on this 
basis the substantial fine imposed by the Commission.
191
 
One could compare the approach of the Commission and the CFI with the US 
case against Microsoft, where the separate claim of monopoly leveraging was 
dismissed by Judge Jackson of the D.C. District Court.
192 Although the Supreme 
Court revived a version of the leverage theory in Eastman Kodak,
193 the Supreme 
Court has recently held in Trinko that for a leverage claim to succeed there must be a 
“dangerous probability of success” in monopolizing a second market.
194 The existence 
of market power on an adjacent market does not seem to be a requirement for the 
application of the leverage theory in Europe.
195 Consequently, the standard of proof 
for leverage claims is higher in the US than in Europe.
196
 
The approaches of the EC competition law and US antitrust also diverge with 
respect to the analysis of the anticompetitive effects. The Commission claimed in its 
Microsoft decision that the tying of Windows Media Player had not only foreclosed 
competition in the media players market,
197 but had also “spillover effects on 
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  42competition in related products such as media encoding and management software 
(often server-side), but also in client PC operating systems for which media players 
compatible with quality content are an important application.”
198 The Commission 
considered that the bundling of Windows with WMP produced the following 
anticompetitive effects: 
 
“Microsoft uses Windows as a distribution channel to ensure for itself a 
significant competitive advantage on the media players market (recital 
979 to the contested decision); 
–    because of the bundling, Microsoft’s competitors are a priori at a 
disadvantage even if their products are inherently better than Windows 
Media Player (ibid.); 
–    Microsoft interferes with the normal competitive process which would 
benefit users by ensuring quicker cycles of innovation as a consequence of 
unfettered competition on the merits (recital 980 to the contested 
decision); 
–    the bundling increases the content and applications barriers to entry, 
which protect Windows, and facilitates the erection of such barriers for 
Windows Media Player (ibid.);  
–    Microsoft shields itself from effective competition from vendors of 
potentially more efficient media players who could challenge its position, 
and thus reduces the talent and capital invested in innovation of media 
players (recital 981 to the contested decision); 
–   by means of the bundling, Microsoft may expand its position in adjacent 
media-related software markets and weaken effective competition, to the 
detriment of consumers (recital 982 to the contested decision); 
–   by means of the bundling, Microsoft sends signals which deter innovation 
in any technologies in which it might conceivably take an interest and 
which it might tie with Windows in the future (recital 983 to the contested 
decision).”
199
The CFI conducted a limited analysis of the alleged anticompetitive effects. 
This is normal practice as Article 230 EC institutes a limited control of the legality of 
the Commission’s decisions and the intensity of the judicial review of the economic 
appreciations of the Commission is necessarily restricted.
200 The CFI concluded that 
“there was a reasonable likelihood that tying Windows and WMP would lead to a 
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  43lessening of competition so that the maintenance of an effective competition structure 
would not be ensured in the foreseeable future.”
201 The CFI used the expression 
“reasonable likelihood” of anticompetitive effects, instead of the expression “capable 
of having” anticompetitive effects, which it had used in previous decisions.
202 It also 
used the expression “actual effects” when it referred to the Commission’s analysis of 
the anticompetitive effects of bundling.
203
 
A closer look to the alleged anticompetitive effects and their analysis by the 
Court reveals, however, that most of these negative effects to consumers were indirect 
and emanated from the fact that Microsoft benefited from an “unparalleled advantage 
with respect to the distribution of its product” that “inevitably had significant 
consequences for the structure of competition” on the streaming media player 
market.
204 First, the bundling of Windows and WMP allowed WMP to benefit “from 
the ubiquity of that operating system on client PCs which cannot be counterbalanced 
by the other methods of distributing media players.”
205 The CFI noted the risk of “de 
facto standardization of the Windows Media Player” market that would follow from 
Microsoft’s practice and the leverage of its quasi-monopoly from the PC operating 
system market to the media player market. Indeed, “(a)lthough, generally, 
standardization may effectively present certain advantages, it cannot be allowed to be 
imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant position by means of tying.”
206 
According to the Court, the emergence of a de facto standard should be the result of 
competition between the “intrinsic merits” of the products and in fine depend from the 
consumers’ choice rather than from the arbitrary decision of a dominant firm to 
impose its own standard.
207  
 
Second, Microsoft’s bundling practice would have restricted consumers’ access 
to similar or better quality products than WMP.
208 The CFI noted that, because of the 
bundling practice, “consumers have an incentive to use Windows Media Player at the 
expense of competing media players, notwithstanding that the latter players are of 
better quality.”
209 It seems that the CFI based this finding on the comparative reviews 
                                            
201 Id. para 1089. 
202 Case T-219/99 above n 51, para 293, where the CFI held that “it is sufficient … to demonstrate that 
the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition, or, in other 
words, that the conduct is capable of having, or likely to have, such an effect.” The Commission has 
also referred to the “capability of conduct to foreclose” and to the “likelihood that an anticompetitive 
foreclosure effect results (from that conduct) in the DG Competition discussion paper on the 
application of Article 82, above n 46, para 59. Compare with the standard of proof when leverage 
through bundling is examined under the merger regulation: See, Case T-210/01 General Electric v. 
Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para 399-473 (the Commission has to establish that the merged 
entity would have been likely (in other words would have sufficient incentives) to engage in bundling 
practices. The Commission has also to consider “the potentially unlawful, and thus sanctionable, nature 
of certain conduct as a factor, which might diminish, or even eliminate, incentives for an undertaking to 
engage in particular conduct” Id. para 304). See also on this point, Case C-12/03 Commission v Tetra 
Laval [2005] ECR I-987, para 74-78. However, both of these two requirements relate to the prospective 
analysis undertaken under the merger regulation and do not therefore indicate, as such, a higher 
standard of proof compared to that applied in Article 82 cases for bundling. 
203 Case T-201/04, above n 4, para 1035.  
204 Id. para 1054. 
205 Id. para 1036 
206 Id. para 1152. 
207 Id. para 1040 & 1046-1047. 
208 Id. para 1356. 
209 Id. para 971. 
  44of media players presented by Microsoft during the administrative procedure before 
the Commission’s decision. These comparative studies indicated that WMP was of 
lower quality than some of the other excluded media players as it had achieved a 
lower rank than RealPlayer in more than half of these comparative reviews.
210
 
 Third, the ubiquity of Windows Media Player as a result of its bundling with 
Windows was capable of having “an appreciable impact on content providers and 
software designers” because of the significant “indirect network effects” (“positive 
feedback loop”) that existed in the WMP market.
211 According to this theory, the 
greater the number of users of a given software platform, the more will be invested in 
developing products compatible with that platform, which in turn will reinforce the 
popularity of that platform with users.
212 The CFI accepted that such a phenomenon 
existed in this case as there was evidence that the content providers and software 
developers chose the technology for which they develop their own products on the 
basis of the percentage of installation and use of media players. Furthermore, the CFI 
ruled that they were inclined because of the cost of additional development and 
administrative costs to use only one technology for their products. Encoding streamed 
content in several formats is expensive and time-consuming and these costs are not 
outweighed from the advantages resulting from encoding in terms of increasing the 
potential reach of content providers and software developers’ products.
213
 
The Court concluded that the ubiquity of Windows Media Player on Windows 
PCs “secured Microsoft a competitive advantage unrelated to the merits of its 
products” and erected a barrier to entry to new “contenders,” not only on the media 
players market but also “on other adjacent markets,” such as “media players on 
wireless information devices, set-top boxed, DRM solutions and on-line music 
delivery.”
214 The Court found that the evolution of the market consistently pointed to 
“a trend in favor of WMP and Windows Media formats to the detriment of the main 
competing media players (and media technologies), such as RealPlayer and 
QuickTime Player.
215 In addition, the RealPlayer installed base was significantly 
lower than that of WMP, as it was present on only 60-70% of home PCs in the US, 
while the rate of installation of WMP was 100% on Windows client PCs and more 
than 90% on client PCs.
216
 
The CFI did not discuss the existence of direct consumer harm and seemed to 
infer consumer detriment from the alteration of the competitive structure of the media 
player market. This is in conformity with the approach generally followed by the 
European Courts for exclusionary abuses under Article 82.
217 The preservation of the 
competitive process constitutes an important objective of competition law. Advocate 
General Kokott in British Airways has eloquently explained this position: 
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  45“The starting-point here must be the protective purpose of Article 82 EC. The 
provision forms part of a system designed to protect competition within the 
internal market from distortions (Article 3(1)(g) EC). Accordingly, Article 82 
EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or 
primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or 
consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as 
such (as an institution), which has already been weakened by the presence of 
the dominant undertaking on the market. In this way, consumers are also 
indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, 
disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.”
218
 
The ECJ and the CFI take a long-term perspective of consumer detriment and 
protect competitors instead of short-term efficiencies. This approach contrasts with 
the dominant approach of the US courts, where although preserving the competitive 
process is an objective of antitrust law, it is also required to bring evidence of at least 
an increase of prices or reduction of output on the market.
219 However, the 
perspective of the European Courts is that competition is a process of discovery of the 
most efficient solution to the benefit of the consumers and that restricting competition 
(in the sense of less rivalry in the market) is presumed to reduce efficiency and be 
detrimental to the consumers in the long term, in particular if the undertaking has an 
overwhelming dominant position.  
 
The obvious shortcoming of this approach is the absence of clear boundaries 
for competition law enforcement. This approach may also explain why EC 
competition law considers that anticompetitive effects may result not only from 
practices that restrict output or increase prices, but also those that restrict more 
broadly consumer choice.
220 However, it is not clear if choice is valued as such or if it 
is preserved only when more choice is likely to lead to identifiable consumer benefits, 
such as better quality products, lower prices, additional services. The CFI’s Microsoft 
decision seems to indicate that choice was valued in this case with the purpose to 
preserve the continuing offer on the market of media players that were at least of 
similar, if not better, quality than WMP.
221 However, what would have been the 
position of the Commission and the CFI if there were no evidence that the excluded 
media players were better or at least similar quality products than WMP? It is also 
unclear if the preservation of consumer choice is, for the CFI, the same thing as the 
preservation of the competitive structure of the market and therefore protecting 
competitors from being marginalized. The language used by the Court seems to 
indicate that this is the case.
222 However, if this interpretation is correct, there is 
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  46finally little difference between the previous quasi per se illegality approach for tying 
and the CFI’s position in Microsoft for technological tying. 
 
4. Preserving consumer choice: a difference in emphasis and adequate remedies 
 
  Antitrust and competition law are for the benefit of consumers and not 
necessarily the benefit of competitors.
223 Consumers benefit from lower prices. 
Consumers also benefit from having choices both in abundance of varieties offered as 
well as from availability of an array of goods of different quality levels.
224 The effects 
of tying and bundling are complex and require significant economic analysis to be 
fully understood, as discussed earlier. The effects of these practices have not yet been 
fully analyzed by economists and the legal understanding of economic analysis 
suffers from significant lags. In the two Microsoft cases, the issue of consumers’ harm 
was particularly complicated because, in both the US and EU cases, both the tied 
products (Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player respectively) and the 
competing products (Netscape and RealAudio) were offered (at least in their basic 
versions) at no charge.  
 
  The fact that the incremental cost of licensing software is negligible allows it 
to be distributed for free with the expectation or hope that the software development 
cost will be recouped if (i) in the future the product will be sold at a positive price, or 
(ii) the firm will be able to sell upgraded versions of the software (with more features) 
at a positive price, or (iii) the firm will be able to sell products or services 
complementary to the free product (for example, sell music or video downloads at a 
positive price). The EU case was additionally complicated by the fact that the WMA 
format (which is the default format for the WMP) was also publicly available, and a 
number of firms competing with Microsoft distributed players that played content in 
this format among others. In fact, in the peculiar world of freely distributed software, 
and in particular in media players, we observe a number of companies distributing 
players that each has a “favored” format and at the same time can play in a number of 
other formats, to the extent that the other format owners allow it. So, for example, 
WMP plays WMA and MP3 formats among others but does not play the RealAudio 
format because its specifications have not been made public. Similarly, RealAudio 
plays its proprietary format, as well as WMA, MP3, and others. Additionally, the 
distribution advantage that any player enjoys is limited because each media player can 
be downloaded and installed in a few minutes. And, in the aftermath of the US v. 
Microsoft settlement, any consumer as well as any computer manufacturer can set up 
any media player as the default one.  
 
The lack of friction in the distribution of all media players, the zero price, the 
quick download and installation time, the ability of the consumer to designate the 
default media player, and the fact that many media players each play many formats, 
make it likely that the potential loss to consumers of a skewed distribution of market 
shares in the media players market will be small. The fact that many players play 
many formats each and the fact that they can be downloaded freely and easily has 
resulted in many consumers having installed in the same computer and using in the 
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  47same time period more than one media player. In this setup, it is much more difficult 
to foreclose rival media players. Similarly, the fact that many media players from 
different producers each play many formats reduces the chance that some formats will 
be marginalized or foreclosed.
225
 
Indeed, in a market where all products are priced at zero, it is hard to make an 
argument of consumer loss because of an anti-competitive price change. It is also hard 
to make a convincing argument of anticompetitive effects based on pricing below cost 
by Microsoft since all firms in this market were pricing below cost. There are only 
two potentially credible consumers’ detriment arguments: (i) that there is a restriction 
of variety or reduction in quality because of the tying of WMP with Windows, and (ii) 
that there will be a clear detriment to future consumers if WMA becomes the 
dominant standard in media players. The Commission argued that the eventual 
dominance of WMP (which it incorrectly predicted) would create a restriction of 
quality in media players. Not only are these quality differences difficult to establish 
factually in a high technology market where product specifications change frequently, 
but blaming a zero priced product for its low quality is going a bit far. The 
Commission also made the argument that future consumers will lose because of less 
innovation. From an economics point view, it is not always easy to sustain such an 
argument since there are published economic models where a monopolist innovates 
more than a perfectly competitive industry.
226  
 
The Commission imposed as a remedy on Microsoft the requirement to 
produce and distribute in the EU a version of Windows without a media player, which 
became known as Windows-N. The Commission’s remedy allowed Microsoft to 
continue producing and distributing in the EU the US version of Windows that was 
subject to the requirements of the consent decree that resolved United States v. 
Microsoft. The EU did not mandate a specific price difference between Windows and 
Windows-N.
227 The two versions of Windows were sold at the same price and 
practically no OEM bought and adopted Windows-N. Thus, the remedy imposed by 
the Commission had no noticeable effect in the marketplace. At the same time, the 
dire predictions of expanded dominance of WMA never materialized in the long 
period between the beginning of the EU case and the Commission’s decision. In 
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  48contrast, a new proprietary format promoted by Apple (tied to hardware also produced 
by Apple!) has become the dominant format in the market for song downloads, a key 
market for goods that are complementary to media players. Additionally, “flash 
player,” a new player from Adobe has become the standard video player in Internet 
browsers. 
  
The most surprising element in the EU’s decision was the remedy. It was 
almost mathematically certain that Windows-N (without WMP), sold at the same 
price as Windows (with WMP), would not sell well, and therefore would have no 
impact. It is also hard to imagine how depriving consumers of WMP in Windows-N 
in the post-US-settlement environment, where both the OEM and the final consumer 
can designate any media player as the default one, would have enhanced consumers’ 
choice. To the extent that the OEMs purchasing decisions express the desires of 
consumers, the devastating failure of Windows-N to sell is evidence that consumers in 
fact liked to have WMP in Windows and the imposed remedy was misguided. 
 
Surprisingly, in negotiations before the Commission’s decision was 
announced, the Commission rejected a reported Microsoft proposed remedy to 
include in the distribution of Windows three rival media players besides WMP and let 
the consumer designate the default player.
228 This proposal that would have 
guaranteed as wide distribution of RealAudio and other players as WMP, would have 
completely erased any distributional advantage of WMP, would have dispelled any 
tying concerns, and would have given full decision power to consumers. Such a 
remedy would have addressed the competition law concerns raised by Microsoft’s 
abuse most effectively and precisely.
229 From an economics point of view, this 
proposal would have eliminated the Microsoft’s distribution advantage. At the same 
time, its adoption would have at least guaranteed the ability of even a dominant firm 
to innovate and distribute in the way it finds most appropriate. The benefits of this 
proposal both for consumers and innovation are obvious and substantial in 
comparison to the imposed remedy.
230 This seems a much more consumer-friendly 




It is widely accepted that existing doctrinal categories or concepts emerge in 
order to serve a specific (analytical or other) purpose, intrinsically linked to the meta-
principle that inspires the particular disciplinary field.
231 There are two objectives to 
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  49be served by classifying: first an instrumental one, which “looks to the reasons that 
the categories were formulated in the first place” and recognizes that “behind the 
different categories lie distinct objectives, principles”; second, an analytical one, as 
the aim of classifying is also to create and maintain “a rational structure for doctrine” 
that would be rigorous enough to fit in different factual contexts.
232 Both of these 
objectives should be fulfilled if the operation of classification is to be useful. 
 
 The comparative analysis of the antitrust standards applying to bundling 
practices in Europe and in the US show that the debate over the “right” analogy for 
bundled discounts or over the definition of the constitutive elements of a tying 
antitrust law infringement, such as the separate products and the coercion test, are 
profoundly interlinked with the “prior beliefs” or the first principles of competition 
law in each jurisdiction.
233 It is certainly true that, in order to fulfil their analytical 
objective, categories in antitrust should “have empirical support” and should 
“communicate valuable information to courts about the competitive effects of a 
general practice.”
234 It is also true, however, that “categorical analysis” should also 
accomplish an instrumental objective. When the aims of competition law are still 
evolving and unclear, as it is still largely the case in EC competition law,
235 the 
relative weight of the analytical or instrumental objectives of classification will 
depend on the availability of empirical evidence on the pro- or anticompetitive effects 
of the given practice. If there is sufficient empirical support and broad consensus in 
the economic profession over the competitive virtues or the anticompetitive effects of 
the practice, the analytical objective of classification will be more compelling than the 
instrumental one and the specific conduct will be analyzed according to the precepts 
of economic analysis. Nevertheless, if empirical evidence or broad consensus is 
insufficient, the classification process will emphasize the instrumental element, the 
objectives of competition law and the input of economic analysis will be less 
significant. The relative discord of economic analysis on bundled discounts and tying 
therefore explains why EC competition law and US antitrust law have adopted 
different approaches, as each jurisdiction seems to have different prior beliefs on the 
existence and/or the degree of the duty of dominant firms to preserve the competitive 
process. 
 
This is particularly clear in the way each jurisdiction deals with the issue of 
anticompetitive foreclosure. It seems to us that in Europe the causal link between 
anticompetitive foreclosure and consumer harm is easily found, that consumer 
detriment is interpreted very broadly, and that it is not always a requirement for the 
application of Article 82, or at least that the standard of proof of a consumer detriment 
is very low in bundling cases compared to the US approach. This, as well as the broad 
interpretation of the coercion requirement for tying cases, may lead to the risk of 
over-enforcement of Article 82, and consequently to false positives, as rivals may use 
Article 82 in order to extract favorable terms in settlements or to impose an important 
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  50litigation burden on the dominant firm. This can be avoided if the Courts examine in 
depth the cost and benefits for the consumer of the given practice, put in its specific 
economic context (an anticompetitive foreclosure test). In the meantime, the hostility 
of the CFI to bundling practices in Microsoft will certainly lead to a number of cases 
being brought to the European Commission and Courts by marginalized rivals 
because of Microsoft’s significant distribution advantage. As the CFI recognized in 
Microsoft: 
 
“Since Microsoft is very likely to maintain its dominant position on the client 
PC operating systems market, at least over the coming years, it cannot be 
precluded that it will have other opportunities to use leveraging vis-à-vis other 
adjacent markets. Furthermore, Microsoft had already faced proceedings in the 
United States for a practice similar to the abusive tying at issue, namely the 
tying of its Internet Explorer browser and its Windows client PC operating 
system, and the possibility cannot be precluded that it might commit the same 
type of infringement in future with other application software.”
236
 
The recent complaint at the European Commission by Opera Software against 
Microsoft for tying its browser to the Windows Operating System
237 may reveal that 
the only possible limiting principle for the application of article 82 EC to the bundling 
practices of Microsoft is international comity for practices that have been the object of 
the US settlement, to the degree that the settlement has resolved the competition 
concerns identified.
238 Without doubt, the CFI’s decision does not mark the end of the 
Microsoft case(s)! 
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